Does a particular action or behavior only attain value AFTER it has been attempted? Hegel famously wrote that "the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only at dusk", and one begins to wonder at what point does the value of leading a good life arise? I wonder if there is somewhat of a lag between acting in a certain way and its subsequent labeling as a eudaimonic act. In that case, one's life can only really be evaluated after it is over, so one cannot participate in the evaluation! As Solon said, "Let no man be called happy before his death. Till then, he is not happy, only lucky."
Glenn, that's certainly Aristotle's position. However, that's because he thinks natural goods are necessary for eudaimonia. Most other schools of virtue ethics put the emphasis on virtue, which is about intentions, not outcomes.
I would be interested to see a comparative study of the concepts of ataraxia in Hellenic thought and the that of dukkha in Early Buddhist thinking. Is ataraxia simply the absence of psycho-physical pain or is it the complete absence of suffering over that pain? For the Buddha, it was possible to have pain in the body and yet not suffer over it. In fact, corporeal pain cannot be avoided and is only fully dispensed with when one attains to parinibbana. Anyway, if you could point me to anything covering the idea of ataraxia in Hellenistic thought I would appreciate it. Every good blessing to you Prof.
In my view you find concepts similar to *dukkha* in many places in classical thought since suffering is and was then very obvious if you walk(ed) the streets. In classical sceptic, epicurean and stoic texts you find them all over the place.
As for ataraxia it can only be compared to Buddhist *nibbana* if it includes a concept of non-self (*anatta*), which is the case only in Pyrrhonism (**adiaphora**) as far as I know.
I'm not aware of any direct comparison with Buddhism, however the Epicureans aimed at both ataraxia (tranquillity of mind and freedom from fear) and aponia (absence of bodily pain).
Does a particular action or behavior only attain value AFTER it has been attempted? Hegel famously wrote that "the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only at dusk", and one begins to wonder at what point does the value of leading a good life arise? I wonder if there is somewhat of a lag between acting in a certain way and its subsequent labeling as a eudaimonic act. In that case, one's life can only really be evaluated after it is over, so one cannot participate in the evaluation! As Solon said, "Let no man be called happy before his death. Till then, he is not happy, only lucky."
Glenn, that's certainly Aristotle's position. However, that's because he thinks natural goods are necessary for eudaimonia. Most other schools of virtue ethics put the emphasis on virtue, which is about intentions, not outcomes.
I would be interested to see a comparative study of the concepts of ataraxia in Hellenic thought and the that of dukkha in Early Buddhist thinking. Is ataraxia simply the absence of psycho-physical pain or is it the complete absence of suffering over that pain? For the Buddha, it was possible to have pain in the body and yet not suffer over it. In fact, corporeal pain cannot be avoided and is only fully dispensed with when one attains to parinibbana. Anyway, if you could point me to anything covering the idea of ataraxia in Hellenistic thought I would appreciate it. Every good blessing to you Prof.
If you compare Hellenic thought to Buddhist thinking, you should compare **ataraxia** to *nibbana* and **astathmēta** to *dukkha*.
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duḥkha#Pyrrhonism and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Similarities_between_Pyrrhonism_and_Buddhism
In my view you find concepts similar to *dukkha* in many places in classical thought since suffering is and was then very obvious if you walk(ed) the streets. In classical sceptic, epicurean and stoic texts you find them all over the place.
As for ataraxia it can only be compared to Buddhist *nibbana* if it includes a concept of non-self (*anatta*), which is the case only in Pyrrhonism (**adiaphora**) as far as I know.
Thank you for this Paul. I’ll need to take a much closer look. Be well!
Mike, on ataraxia I wrote this: https://howtobeastoic.wordpress.com/2015/12/26/apatheia-vs-ataraxia-whats-the-difference/
I'm not aware of any direct comparison with Buddhism, however the Epicureans aimed at both ataraxia (tranquillity of mind and freedom from fear) and aponia (absence of bodily pain).
Thank you!