I'm just an armchair reader. But 44 years ago, when I gave up religion, I put this little formula together. 1. The physical universe exists. 2. Consciousness exists. 3. Magic isn't real. 4. Consciousness must emerge from the physical universe. I've refined it a little since then, but I stand by my original formula. Consciousness doesn't emerge everywhere. And I have no problem at all with the thought, I don't know .
It’s a shame because I like Bernardo Kastrup and found his book Rational Spirituality quite interesting….Why Materialism is Baloney, on the other hand, I found to be complete nonsense.
Great summary! I also agree with the critiques of Cartesian Dualism regarding the Interaction Problem and just the fact that we see how deeply our conscious experience ties to neural states.
That said, I am sympathetic to property dualism. I’m not convinced by the P-Zombie or Cartesian Disembodied Mind Thought Experiment, but I do find the Argument from Intentionality interesting. I do think thoughts seem to have certain properties/functions that it would be impossible for a purely physical object to have.
So then I think physicalism is false, but what exactly replaces it I have no idea. And I don’t think it matters much for neuroscientists since I think it’s more epiphenomenal perhaps?
Matthew, on what grounds are you saying that thoughts have properties that are impossible? That's a very strong claim, as distinct to "we don't know yet."
I’d reference the Argument from Intentionality. Thoughts can point beyond themselves to something else. For instance, if I think of an elephant, there is no elephant in my head. It’s pointing to something beyond itself. The thought itself is not an elephant but references it.
Physical objects don’t have this property/ability. A rock does not point beyond itself to something else. Now you may say “well what about a sign or words in a book?”. To that I would say those objects don’t have intrinsic intentionality—it is only us that is giving these physical marks/objects meaning.
There is no possible physical law that could be discovered or conceived of that would allow for purely material objects to point beyond themselves. And even if you think that’s possible, that would have to mean that these physical objects have nonphysical aspects to them and we’d end up with panpsychism!
I’ll concede I do think this is purely metaphysics though. I do not think it matters for neuroscience. Neuroscience is fine with simply stating that some neural structure or process is the elephant.
Matthew, this is a classic move — the Argument from Intentionality goes back to Brentano, and it deserves a serious reply. Intentionality is indeed one of the most interesting challenges for physicalism, and Brentano's original insight deserves respect. But I think the argument has several significant weaknesses.
First, the key distinction you invoke — between derived and intrinsic intentionality — actually cuts against the conclusion you want. You correctly note that signs and words have only derived intentionality (we give them meaning). But then the question becomes: what makes neural states special enough to have intrinsic intentionality? You've asserted they do, but that's precisely what needs to be established. If the charge against physicalism is that it can't explain intentionality, simply stipulating that brains have it intrinsically while rocks don't doesn't advance the argument.
Second, serious physicalist accounts of intentionality actually do exist. Ruth Millikan's teleosemantic theory grounds intentionality in biological function: a mental state is about elephants because it was shaped by evolution (and individual learning) to track and respond to elephants. Fred Dretske's informational semantics grounds it in causal-informational relations — a brain state carries information about X when it reliably co-varies with X in the right way. These aren't hand-waving; they're detailed, published philosophical programs. My preference, incidentally, is for evolutionary explanations.
Third, your claim that "no possible physical law could allow purely material objects to point beyond themselves" is doing enormous work — but it's essentially asserting the conclusion rather than arguing for it. Why couldn't causal-informational relations between a physical system and its environment constitute intentionality? The thought of an elephant doesn't need to contain an elephant; it needs to stand in the right kind of causal, evolutionary, and functional relations to actual elephants. That's precisely what the physicalist proposes.
Fourth, the slide to panpsychism at the end doesn't follow. Even if one were tempted to think intentionality requires something beyond standard physical description, that wouldn't give you panpsychism — panpsychism is a claim about phenomenal consciousness (there being something it's like to be), not about aboutness. Best not to conflate the two.
Intentionality, I'd argue, is actually one of the more tractable phenomena for physicalism — precisely because functional and causal relations are the kind of thing physical systems can bear to the world.
As a property dualist, I challenge your statement that property dualism "posits entities and / or properties with no detectability and no explanatory work that physicalism can’t do, and so it is at the very least redundant".
The distinction between substance dualism and property dualism is implicit in Aristotle's critique of Plato's view of the Forms. Aristotle proclaimed that the Forms do not exist apart from things.
Although you are skeptical of metaphysical approaches to ontology and physicality, I have found this approach useful. I wrote up a long paper that manifests Aristotle's view of the forms in the physical processes of Quantum Mechanics. This analysis led me (unwillingly) to a pan-proto-psychism similar to that of Chalmers. See "Hylomorphic Functions": https://researchers.one/articles/18.11.00009
This paper is not peer-reviewed (which immediately discounts it), since I moved on to other subjects. But the first third of the paper has actually been published in a peer-reviewed journal as "Causally Active Metaphysical Realism". As you can see by the title, I anticipate objections such as yours and demonstrate that abstract concepts (the Forms that Aristotle discusses) are real and that they cause things to happen. Therefore they are detectable and are the explanation of things and events in this world. I even end the paper with a series of testable experiments. One nice property of my theory is that it relativizes naturally.
Collapsed into a sentence, my thesis is that the physical world is the Schrodinger Wave Equation, but the collapse of the wave function is the generation of an abstract concept - a Fact that is the instantiation of a Form (what I call a Hylomorphic Function).
Causally Active Metaphysical Realism
Quantum Speculations (supplement to the International Journal of Quantum Foundations), Volume 1, Number 1, October 2019, Pages 1-31.
I agree with Massimo. Ask yourself if a form is a mental construct from observation or imagination (requiring caloric throughput) which is anthropogenic. If not, where did that concept originate?
Also, as I think he implies, if quantum events cause willful actions, then your volition is displaced. In my initial comment, I used the phrase "will free of physical causes" because "free will" is not as clear a term. Are you claiming that QM is not physical despite being unpredictable?
Antony, we are in the 21st century. Do we really need to go back to the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle? Property dualism is just as untestable as substance dualism, by admission of supporters like Chalmers and Goff. And of course it violates Occam's razor because it assumes new properties / substances for which we have no evidence.
I honestly tried to make sense of what you write at the end about the Schrodinger function, but I can't. What does it mean that the collapse *is* the generation of an abstract thought? How do you know that? How can a Form be a *fact*?
Masterfully and efficiently articulated. Very much looking forward to Part 2. Perhaps it will include your theories - even if just speculations - as to why dualism and idealism and the like, whether religious or otherwise, remain so sticky and tightly grasped. It strikes me as something with remarkably deep cultural foundations, perhaps so deep and so foundational that the stubborn need for that belief/perspective, in whatever manner or way we express or describe it, even has biological rootedness. In any event, thank you for this post!
Naturally I think your definition and explanation of physicalism and its detractors, is very well done, since I agree with it all. And it does not appear to conflict with my view of free will which is subtly different than yours (unless you show me differently).
I don't have a really solid view of our differences, so I will describe how I think our discussion went and ended.
I have always disliked the idea that my life is basically determined by past events with me having no control over my actions, but for years I had no logical choice but to agree that free will did not exist. Then several years ago I realized that the natural uncertainty of quantum mechanics solved the problem. If the processes of the brain were directly affected by quantum events presented to my subconscious, then I could choose which of those events (which are not determined by past events) would be best for my rational life objectives.
You did not really disagree, but you stated that my solution did not satisfy the "standard" (academic?) definition of "free" will. So in the end we simply differed on what free will meant.
I quit posting because I had essentially made my important (to me) presentation of my "solution" to the free will problem and with your disagreement with my meaning of free will, I had no way to really go on, unless I took the time to read the philosophical academic discussions in the literature.
Ah yes, that rings a bell. Your account has actually been proposed in the literature. I don't doubt that quantum phenomena exist, of course, though it's still an open question whether and how frequently they reverberate to the macroscopic level of brain events. It's also still an open question whether quantum phenomena are truly random or not. But if they are, they introduce randomness from which -- I think -- you cannot "choose." Your choices are still the result of cause and effect, just made a bit more unpredictable by the random element.
At the end of our previous dialogue (Mar 9) you wrote:
"this exchange was, I think, a model of what I'm trying to do here at Figs: a community of reasoners who don't necessarily end up agreeing on everything, but can constructively and respectfully talk to each other in a general quest for better understanding."
I am not aware that my exact account has been in the literature, but I do know that quantum phenomena have been proposed as a source of "undetermined" will. However, that did not satisfy me since it is no kind of will that is under my control.
I do think that the brain is a sufficiently complex and microscopic area (even in many animals) that quantum phenomena continually take place. I agree that it is not yet know if they are fully random but they are at the least uncertain in the sense of not being totally causal (think of the diverse content of dreams).
I maintain that I can (and have always been able to) choose among those notions (ideas, thoughts) that are presented to my conscious for the actions that I think will be best for my rational life objectives. The only difference now is that these ideas are no longer nothing more than the results of my prior existence, but instead gives me a modicum of self-control over my existence.
It is that high level of control over my actions that I call my free will.
Paul, whether quantum phenomena play a significant role in neurobiology remains to be seen, empirically. They might, I'm agnostic about it. What keeps puzzling me is how do you think you can choose between alternatives resulting from quantum fluctuations. I just don't see the mechanism there. And you certainly don't control the quantum fluctuations themselves, so I maintain that you still have no free will. Why is that so bothersome, you think?
Thank you for a well thought-out summary of the situation. I am an agnostic in this area as in many others, but I have to admit that physicalism does have some supporting evidence, although I am not convinced it is the "whole story". We human animals tend to believe that we can construct valid models of reality in our minds (and reproduce them in more durable media), and again I think it is true in part, but again not necessarily in entirety. If we consider the nature of the universe we live in (or think we do) and try to figure out why and how it is there, and not nothing, or something else, we are in a similar situation. But it is worthwhile that intelligent people such as yourself are delving into the problem and sharing your insights. Again, thank you.
Michael, appreciated. We will probably never have the whole story. But I'm only willing to accept bits and pieces that I think are well supported by the evidence. I'm okay with tentative conclusions and incomplete pictures.
Wonderful piece, Massimo. Your broad knowledge and various details are welcome as I'm a rank amateur in both philosophy and science. I've propounded physicalism (along with denying will free of physical causes) for around 1/4C. Recall that a few years ago I initiated a short three way with Dan Dennett and you on the latter point. Dennett's Compatibilism struck me as inconsistent with his physicalism. He never relented, although I challenged him.
I'm just an armchair reader. But 44 years ago, when I gave up religion, I put this little formula together. 1. The physical universe exists. 2. Consciousness exists. 3. Magic isn't real. 4. Consciousness must emerge from the physical universe. I've refined it a little since then, but I stand by my original formula. Consciousness doesn't emerge everywhere. And I have no problem at all with the thought, I don't know .
Ha! “urea moment”!!!
It’s a shame because I like Bernardo Kastrup and found his book Rational Spirituality quite interesting….Why Materialism is Baloney, on the other hand, I found to be complete nonsense.
🤣
Great summary! I also agree with the critiques of Cartesian Dualism regarding the Interaction Problem and just the fact that we see how deeply our conscious experience ties to neural states.
That said, I am sympathetic to property dualism. I’m not convinced by the P-Zombie or Cartesian Disembodied Mind Thought Experiment, but I do find the Argument from Intentionality interesting. I do think thoughts seem to have certain properties/functions that it would be impossible for a purely physical object to have.
So then I think physicalism is false, but what exactly replaces it I have no idea. And I don’t think it matters much for neuroscientists since I think it’s more epiphenomenal perhaps?
Matthew, on what grounds are you saying that thoughts have properties that are impossible? That's a very strong claim, as distinct to "we don't know yet."
I’d reference the Argument from Intentionality. Thoughts can point beyond themselves to something else. For instance, if I think of an elephant, there is no elephant in my head. It’s pointing to something beyond itself. The thought itself is not an elephant but references it.
Physical objects don’t have this property/ability. A rock does not point beyond itself to something else. Now you may say “well what about a sign or words in a book?”. To that I would say those objects don’t have intrinsic intentionality—it is only us that is giving these physical marks/objects meaning.
There is no possible physical law that could be discovered or conceived of that would allow for purely material objects to point beyond themselves. And even if you think that’s possible, that would have to mean that these physical objects have nonphysical aspects to them and we’d end up with panpsychism!
I’ll concede I do think this is purely metaphysics though. I do not think it matters for neuroscience. Neuroscience is fine with simply stating that some neural structure or process is the elephant.
Matthew, this is a classic move — the Argument from Intentionality goes back to Brentano, and it deserves a serious reply. Intentionality is indeed one of the most interesting challenges for physicalism, and Brentano's original insight deserves respect. But I think the argument has several significant weaknesses.
First, the key distinction you invoke — between derived and intrinsic intentionality — actually cuts against the conclusion you want. You correctly note that signs and words have only derived intentionality (we give them meaning). But then the question becomes: what makes neural states special enough to have intrinsic intentionality? You've asserted they do, but that's precisely what needs to be established. If the charge against physicalism is that it can't explain intentionality, simply stipulating that brains have it intrinsically while rocks don't doesn't advance the argument.
Second, serious physicalist accounts of intentionality actually do exist. Ruth Millikan's teleosemantic theory grounds intentionality in biological function: a mental state is about elephants because it was shaped by evolution (and individual learning) to track and respond to elephants. Fred Dretske's informational semantics grounds it in causal-informational relations — a brain state carries information about X when it reliably co-varies with X in the right way. These aren't hand-waving; they're detailed, published philosophical programs. My preference, incidentally, is for evolutionary explanations.
Third, your claim that "no possible physical law could allow purely material objects to point beyond themselves" is doing enormous work — but it's essentially asserting the conclusion rather than arguing for it. Why couldn't causal-informational relations between a physical system and its environment constitute intentionality? The thought of an elephant doesn't need to contain an elephant; it needs to stand in the right kind of causal, evolutionary, and functional relations to actual elephants. That's precisely what the physicalist proposes.
Fourth, the slide to panpsychism at the end doesn't follow. Even if one were tempted to think intentionality requires something beyond standard physical description, that wouldn't give you panpsychism — panpsychism is a claim about phenomenal consciousness (there being something it's like to be), not about aboutness. Best not to conflate the two.
Intentionality, I'd argue, is actually one of the more tractable phenomena for physicalism — precisely because functional and causal relations are the kind of thing physical systems can bear to the world.
As a property dualist, I challenge your statement that property dualism "posits entities and / or properties with no detectability and no explanatory work that physicalism can’t do, and so it is at the very least redundant".
The distinction between substance dualism and property dualism is implicit in Aristotle's critique of Plato's view of the Forms. Aristotle proclaimed that the Forms do not exist apart from things.
Although you are skeptical of metaphysical approaches to ontology and physicality, I have found this approach useful. I wrote up a long paper that manifests Aristotle's view of the forms in the physical processes of Quantum Mechanics. This analysis led me (unwillingly) to a pan-proto-psychism similar to that of Chalmers. See "Hylomorphic Functions": https://researchers.one/articles/18.11.00009
This paper is not peer-reviewed (which immediately discounts it), since I moved on to other subjects. But the first third of the paper has actually been published in a peer-reviewed journal as "Causally Active Metaphysical Realism". As you can see by the title, I anticipate objections such as yours and demonstrate that abstract concepts (the Forms that Aristotle discusses) are real and that they cause things to happen. Therefore they are detectable and are the explanation of things and events in this world. I even end the paper with a series of testable experiments. One nice property of my theory is that it relativizes naturally.
Collapsed into a sentence, my thesis is that the physical world is the Schrodinger Wave Equation, but the collapse of the wave function is the generation of an abstract concept - a Fact that is the instantiation of a Form (what I call a Hylomorphic Function).
Causally Active Metaphysical Realism
Quantum Speculations (supplement to the International Journal of Quantum Foundations), Volume 1, Number 1, October 2019, Pages 1-31.
https://ijqf.org/archives/5704
I agree with Massimo. Ask yourself if a form is a mental construct from observation or imagination (requiring caloric throughput) which is anthropogenic. If not, where did that concept originate?
Also, as I think he implies, if quantum events cause willful actions, then your volition is displaced. In my initial comment, I used the phrase "will free of physical causes" because "free will" is not as clear a term. Are you claiming that QM is not physical despite being unpredictable?
Antony, we are in the 21st century. Do we really need to go back to the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle? Property dualism is just as untestable as substance dualism, by admission of supporters like Chalmers and Goff. And of course it violates Occam's razor because it assumes new properties / substances for which we have no evidence.
I honestly tried to make sense of what you write at the end about the Schrodinger function, but I can't. What does it mean that the collapse *is* the generation of an abstract thought? How do you know that? How can a Form be a *fact*?
Masterfully and efficiently articulated. Very much looking forward to Part 2. Perhaps it will include your theories - even if just speculations - as to why dualism and idealism and the like, whether religious or otherwise, remain so sticky and tightly grasped. It strikes me as something with remarkably deep cultural foundations, perhaps so deep and so foundational that the stubborn need for that belief/perspective, in whatever manner or way we express or describe it, even has biological rootedness. In any event, thank you for this post!
David, thanks! Part II will present some of my speculative ideas, more than theories, but that's all I have to offer at the moment.
Naturally I think your definition and explanation of physicalism and its detractors, is very well done, since I agree with it all. And it does not appear to conflict with my view of free will which is subtly different than yours (unless you show me differently).
Paul, thanks. I'm curious, how do you think our views on free will differ?
I don't have a really solid view of our differences, so I will describe how I think our discussion went and ended.
I have always disliked the idea that my life is basically determined by past events with me having no control over my actions, but for years I had no logical choice but to agree that free will did not exist. Then several years ago I realized that the natural uncertainty of quantum mechanics solved the problem. If the processes of the brain were directly affected by quantum events presented to my subconscious, then I could choose which of those events (which are not determined by past events) would be best for my rational life objectives.
You did not really disagree, but you stated that my solution did not satisfy the "standard" (academic?) definition of "free" will. So in the end we simply differed on what free will meant.
I quit posting because I had essentially made my important (to me) presentation of my "solution" to the free will problem and with your disagreement with my meaning of free will, I had no way to really go on, unless I took the time to read the philosophical academic discussions in the literature.
Ah yes, that rings a bell. Your account has actually been proposed in the literature. I don't doubt that quantum phenomena exist, of course, though it's still an open question whether and how frequently they reverberate to the macroscopic level of brain events. It's also still an open question whether quantum phenomena are truly random or not. But if they are, they introduce randomness from which -- I think -- you cannot "choose." Your choices are still the result of cause and effect, just made a bit more unpredictable by the random element.
At the end of our previous dialogue (Mar 9) you wrote:
"this exchange was, I think, a model of what I'm trying to do here at Figs: a community of reasoners who don't necessarily end up agreeing on everything, but can constructively and respectfully talk to each other in a general quest for better understanding."
I am not aware that my exact account has been in the literature, but I do know that quantum phenomena have been proposed as a source of "undetermined" will. However, that did not satisfy me since it is no kind of will that is under my control.
I do think that the brain is a sufficiently complex and microscopic area (even in many animals) that quantum phenomena continually take place. I agree that it is not yet know if they are fully random but they are at the least uncertain in the sense of not being totally causal (think of the diverse content of dreams).
I maintain that I can (and have always been able to) choose among those notions (ideas, thoughts) that are presented to my conscious for the actions that I think will be best for my rational life objectives. The only difference now is that these ideas are no longer nothing more than the results of my prior existence, but instead gives me a modicum of self-control over my existence.
It is that high level of control over my actions that I call my free will.
Paul, whether quantum phenomena play a significant role in neurobiology remains to be seen, empirically. They might, I'm agnostic about it. What keeps puzzling me is how do you think you can choose between alternatives resulting from quantum fluctuations. I just don't see the mechanism there. And you certainly don't control the quantum fluctuations themselves, so I maintain that you still have no free will. Why is that so bothersome, you think?
Thank you for a well thought-out summary of the situation. I am an agnostic in this area as in many others, but I have to admit that physicalism does have some supporting evidence, although I am not convinced it is the "whole story". We human animals tend to believe that we can construct valid models of reality in our minds (and reproduce them in more durable media), and again I think it is true in part, but again not necessarily in entirety. If we consider the nature of the universe we live in (or think we do) and try to figure out why and how it is there, and not nothing, or something else, we are in a similar situation. But it is worthwhile that intelligent people such as yourself are delving into the problem and sharing your insights. Again, thank you.
Michael, appreciated. We will probably never have the whole story. But I'm only willing to accept bits and pieces that I think are well supported by the evidence. I'm okay with tentative conclusions and incomplete pictures.
Wonderful piece, Massimo. Your broad knowledge and various details are welcome as I'm a rank amateur in both philosophy and science. I've propounded physicalism (along with denying will free of physical causes) for around 1/4C. Recall that a few years ago I initiated a short three way with Dan Dennett and you on the latter point. Dennett's Compatibilism struck me as inconsistent with his physicalism. He never relented, although I challenged him.
I was unaware of Galen Strawson's panpsychism, as my only exposure to him focussed on free will, which he denies. https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/strawsong/
I eagerly await part 2.
Steve Kurtz
Steven, much appreciated, thank you.