I have been thinking that there needs to be a component of personal relativism or moral skepticism in any moral theory that we ought to consider. That being, "maybe we're wrong". Both in the present and in the future, by which I mean on reflection.
I am a layman so maybe this is old ground but I am surprised I haven't come across it. Any thoughts or sign posts are appreciated!
Matt, yes, we should absolutely always keep in mind that we could be wrong. But I wouldn't call that relativism. It's skepticism. Specifically the kind of skepticism advocated by people like Carneades and Cicero.
I've published a few essays on that approach right here at FiW. Check out these:
Hi Massimo, very much enjoyed the article and helpful references. I have a question about the structure of the argument. If one doesn't accept the axiom in the IF statement (e.g. caring about human welfare, say a Stalin) then there are not any facts (e.g. human welfare) to reason about. Is this correct? If so, then are we not back to relativism? Or alternatively, is it the case that only agreement on starting axioms result in agreement of moral facts?
Mark, if Staling rejects the axiom then our only choice is to resist him. As people have, in fact done. I don't think that slides us back into relativism because there is mounting evidence that prosocial behavior is built into our genes, which makes sense since we are a highly social species. So rejecting the axioms is equivalent to rejecting nature herself, always a perilous proposition.
I think though it’s worth keeping in mind that in contexts like war, manslaughter, self-defense, etc., the rightness or wrongness is certainly debatable and not subject to purely objective standards or rules, and it also seems to me that concepts like gain, pleasure and randomness are also inherently subjective.
I was thinking about this discussion last night, and a related scenario which came to mind which I think illustrates the issue well is, of course, the trolley problem (I know, I know…). It’s a situation which does involve killing. And where you could have Epicurus, Aristotle, Bentham and Kant all evaluating the rightness and wrongness of the various permutations and each reaching a different conclusion, all the while applying perfect reason and logic. And even within schools of thought, you could see Chrysippus, Epictetus and Seneca all reaching different conclusions too, depending on the facts and circumstances.
Reason is like English, or a level. It’s a tool with its own internal rules and processes, and it can be evaluated and judged on that basis. Perhaps we could call that internal objectivity. I would be objectively mistaken if I spelled “Stoic” as “Sgdfgfdghd.” But when we apply those tools in any given situation, we bring to bear values, priorities, facts, perspectives, circumstances, etc that are ultimately subjective, or if objective (like a fact) are interpreted through a subjective lens. Our reason helps us analyze the inputs, and generate a range of outputs which it then helps us rank and ultimately take us to a choice or decision. And I think you are right that in so so many cases, there is so much enormous and persuasive consensus that it can feel “objective.” But I would still contend that it is not.
I am tempted in cases like this to dismiss the conversation entirely and say, we agree on substance, and practically speaking, there is no real daylight between our positions. And that this is just an academic and irrelevant discussion. But I don’t think it is. I think it’s really important that we stare the reality in the face and wrestle with it. And that’s that we are floating in a disenchanted universe with no a priori or transcendent - or objective - demands or rules when it comes to ethics - or morals - and it’s the human project to figure that out.
It’s why I enjoy your writing so much. You are not afraid to follow your training as both a scientist and a philosopher to its ultimate and logical conclusions, even if those positions may be shocking and rattling to many - and in their own way, anti-social. It’s how we get out of the cave. And I really appreciate and value the work you do on that front.
David, thanks for the kind words, much appreciated!
But (you knew there was a but, right?), objectivity is not synonymous with cosmic transcendence. I am not claiming that there are laws of morality similar to the laws of nature uncovered by science. That would be moral relativism.
But there definitely are objective moral standards that apply not just to humans, but to any intelligent social animal. That’s why theft is punished among bonobos and murder is rare in any primate species.
Yes, different schools of thought disagree, though I don’t think they disagree as much as people often think. But disagreement is not evidence of anything other than disagreement. People can disagree because they are wrong, not because there is no fact of the matter.
Do you evaluate the behavior of other primates against objective moral standards? If one Bonobo steals from another, and is punished, that’s certainly a function of sociocultural utility, but would you say that it represents the violation of an objective moral standard? If so, who or what defines that? If not, then when, at what stage, or for what reason do you separate Homo Sapiens from other primates in this regard? My personal view is that there are no objective moral standards, it’s all sociocultural utility, and that’s inherently malleable and dynamic over time and place and circumstance - for all primates (and I suppose any creature with some sort of higher intellectual functioning). We just have the benefit of advanced language, advanced reason - and opposable thumbs. Which allows us to consider these issues more dimensionally, and build more elaborate societies as a consequence. But regardless, it’s all happening in white space.
If a bonobo steals from another it is violating the same objective moral standard as if you or I were stealing from another. Because stealing objectively, empirically undermine group harmony and individual flourishing. The difference between the bonobo and us is that he is not aware of the ethical nature of the violation, because he cannot articulate that kind of thought. Nevertheless, he will be punished by other bonobos if caught.
Thank you for another thoughtful and thought provoking article. It seems, as usual, the extremes on both sides are wrong and the truth is found somewhere between them. I think of myself as a moral pluralist; that a minimum amount of a kind of “moral realism” can be loosely defined on practical grounds as a framework for individual freedom. I just don’t believe that it is metaphysical and true for all people at all times.
I’m not a moral relativist because I think morality is social, and therefore things that are antisocial are not moral. (Again, what’s antisocial isn’t defined metaphysically, but practically within a society.) Morality differs from virtue in part because if I am stranded alone on an island, I can still be virtuous, but there are no one to interact with. Morality doesn’t seem to exist with out social interaction. Am I wrong or misunderstanding something?
Bob, sounds about right to me! The only caveat is that I’d suggest some moral rules are valid for all human beings. Like no stealing and no murdering. But they are not universal in any metaphysical sense of the term.
Agreed. This is where the Stoic idea of living according to human nature, i.e. as a social creature. I like the Buddhist concept of “interbeeing”. We are not fully human outside of our social context. Even in isolation, I will continue living in the context of a self identity created by prior social experience.
Murder is wrongful killing, stealing is wrongful possession (or dispossession). Murder and theft are universally recognized as immoral. But right on wrong are opinions we develop in society.
Totalitarianism is beyond the pale because it erases the boundaries between public and private life. I’m left, as a layman, with opinions
You seem to be hedging your bets here. You agree that murder and theft are wrong, but then you say that right and wrong are opinions. They are not. Murder and theft are wrong (for social, intelligent animals, if we care about social harmony and individual flourishing) period, regardless of what anyone’s opinion is.
My wording was sloppy and unclear. What I intended to say is that we can all agree that murder is wrong, but disagree about what constitutes murder. I have loved ones who believe any abortion at any time regardless of the circumstances is murder, even if the mother risks her own death. I have loved ones who believe that if a mother dies because she is forced by the government to carry a non-viable pregnancy to a still birth, that is murder. This is an example of the opinions I speak of.
Agreeing murder is wrong is only a starting point, we have to determine and agree about what constitutes a murder.
Ah yes! Indeed, that's actually a good example of what Cicero and Seneca are talking about when they say that Nature gives us the beginnings of wisdom, but we need reason to build on it.
Nature tells us that murder is wrong. Then we have to reason our way to what does and does not count as murder.
True indeed! I haven't made as much progress in the last sixty years sorting this out. Perhaps nature will grant me another sixty, and I'll finally be a sage! I'm going to continue working on it, until then. Thanks as always.
Thanks for an insightful discussion of moral values and moral objectivity.
I see another possibility for understanding what is objectively moral.
If we use the right definitions of moral and immoral, a science based moral equivalent of the law of gravity is possible.
Specifically,
• Behaviors that solve cooperation problems are ‘moral’.
• Behaviors that create cooperation problems are ‘immoral’.
Here, ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’
• Refer to behaviors consistent with or contradictory to the primary reason cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist – they solve cooperation problems.
• And do NOT refer to any imperative obligations or “What everyone ought do regardless of their needs and preferences” (Mackie identified the existence of such things as impossibly strange and Michael Ruse identifies them as “illusions foisted on us by our genes”).
Whether or not there is a science based moral equivalent of the law of gravity depends on how we define the word moral. If “moral” is defined as imperative obligations, then it is impossible for the reasons Mackie described. But if “moral” is defined (as science suggests) as consistent with the primary reason cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist, then deriving a science based moral equivalent of the law of gravity is straightforward using the normal methods of science.
We are free to make philosophical definitions of moral and immoral however we think will be most useful or coherent. Will the functional definition be more culturally useful and philosophically coherent? I expect so. It should be easy to be more useful and coherent than the imperative ought definition which describes something that exists only as an illusion.
The idea that we could philosophically define moral behaviors as those consistent with the primary reason cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist (their function) seems to me an idea worth discussion.
Mark, if it were so easy to come up with the ethical equivalent of a law of gravity I would have expected people to have done it by now. And yet...
I don't think cooperation is the ultimate standard. The Nazi cooperated very effectively with each other, and yet we don't think they acted morally.
The problem that morality has to solve is how to make human beings act prosocially (which includes cooperation) while at the same time being able to pursue their own projects and interests, within certain limits (i.e., limits that do not infringe on others' freedom to pursue their own projects and interests).
That's why it's complicated, and that's why you need both empirical input (science, especially social science) and good reasoning (philosophy).
Regarding Nazis, in addition to cooperating, they were cooperating to exploit others and thereby creating cooperation problems. Creating cooperation problems is contradictory to the function of cultural moral norms and therefore immoral by the above claimed principles. The inconsistency with our intuitions regarding Nazis you mention does not exist.
I also disagree that the above implies that good philosophy would no longer be required to answer our questions about morality.
While clear about what moral ‘means’ ‘are’, the science of morality is almost silent regarding the goals of moral behavior. And this science is similarly silent on important aspects of the broader ethical questions “What is good?”, “How should I live?”, and “What are my obligations?”
Answering such ethical questions goes well beyond the domain of science. I see the above moral principles from science illuminating our understanding of virtue ethics and consequentialist moral theories, not contradicting them.
Am I understanding you correctly that you see no reasons to seek an alternative to philosophical definitions of “moral” based on an illusion – behaviors that are something like imperative obligations?
The Nazis, and other religious or secular totalitarians, seem to me to be outside of what I understand as morality. If morality is a system that allows individuals to work out right and wrong in their social interactions and obligations, then it seems to me that totalitarianisms replace morality with a system of thought that eliminates the boundary between individuals and society. Instead of moral reasoning of the individual, the "correct" thought in totalitarianism is how to best participate in and advance the greater narrative of the society. The leader embodies the will of the society, so each person is no longer an individual morally, but an agent of society's will.
Bob, ask yourself if Nazi, religious, or secular totalitarian supporters (average people in the populace) would agree that “Do to others as you would have them do to you” is generally reliable moral guidance. I expect they will. If they do, then they are fully within the fold of their moral ‘means’ being defined by Morality as Cooperation Strategies.
We would still disagree with them about limitations (perhaps dictated by the persuasive autocrat) about who is in the “circle of moral concern” (Peter Singer’s phrase) and deserves full moral concern and who deserves less or no moral concern as ‘enemies’ or ‘threats’ (and other ‘races’ for the Nazi example).
We would also disagree with them about the ultimate goals (ends) of moral behavior, again as perhaps dictated by the persuasive autocrat.
So, we would disagree about the circle of moral concern and the ultimate goals of moral behavior, but their moral means are still firmly in the same domain as ours. To maintain cooperative societies, it is a necessity that the society’s morality (or laws if they have no morality) solves cooperation problems.
Modern autocrats commonly appear to be psychopaths (people with no conscience or empathy). And the strong hierarchical structures they typically impose attract psychopaths. While psychopaths would recognize the Golden Rule, it would not occur to them that they were under any obligation to follow it. Psychopath's personal rules for interacting with other people are outside what we would understand as morality.
Mark, I still don't see how your exclusive focus on cooperation gets you out of the Nazi objection. Or, for that matter, how it accounts for a lot of what we consider moral / immoral behavior. As I said, cooperation is part of the picture for sure, but it's not sufficient (though I suspect it's necessary).
Massimo, Morality as Cooperation Strategies gets out of the Nazi problem by recognizing that the morality of a behavior’s means must be judged separately from the ends of that behavior.
Past and present cultural moral norms are virtually all parts of cooperation strategies. There is a fact of the matter that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems that are objective parts of our universe (that are as innate to our universe as the logic and mathematics that define them). Whether a behavior is consistent with or contradicts the universal function of culturally moral ‘means’ provides an objective reference for right and wrong behavior grounded in objective aspects of our universe.
There is no universal function for the ‘ends’ of the cooperation that moral behaviors enable; people cooperate to accomplish whatever they can agree on. The morality of ‘ends’ must be judged separately.
Within their circle of moral concern, Nazis morally cooperated by following the Golden Rule and other moral norms as moral means but cooperated with the immoral ends of exploiting (causing cooperation problems for) people outside the Nazi circle of moral concern.
You are right, of course. Most people are highly moral in this sense, if they are dealing with an ingroup member. I know racist MAGA people who are gracious and giving to me and others who fit their idea of the right kind of American. The kind of Totalitarian I am talking about is the true believer (to use Eric Hoffer's term). He or she would gladly give their own life to advance the cause. Is therefore taking the life of others for the sake of the cause moral under the Golden Rule?
First, let’s review the general case for determining when it is right or wrong to follow the Golden Rule or virtually any other cultural moral norm (from a Morality as Cooperation Strategies perspective), then a specific case that may be illuminating.
The function of cultural moral norms is solving cooperation problems. If circumstances are such that following the norm will solve a cooperation problem, then following the norm in those circumstances is objectively right (moral) in our universe. In circumstances when following the norm will create a cooperation problem, then it is objectively wrong (immoral) in our universe.
An example: A critical part of maintaining cooperation within an army and achieving the army’s goals is the moral norm of soldiers accepting commands from higher ranking officers that will certainly get some of them killed. The existence of an organized hierarchy is an important part of what makes it morally acceptable to send other people in harm’s way to serve the greater good.
Without the organized hierarchy, people spontaneously causing the death of someone willing to die for the cause would lead to chaos, cause cooperation problems, and be immoral. With this organized hierarchy, causing the death of someone willing to die for the cause solves the cooperation problem of “Who will risk their lives for the cause” and would be moral.
The Golden Rule is a usually reliable, but fallible, heuristic for initiating reciprocity. It is not a moral absolute and the morality of following it depends on circumstances.
Bob, and yet even the Nazi claim to follow a kind of morality. Which is why I keep thinking that Socrates was right when he said that unwisdom is the root of all evil.
Perhaps I cannot escape my Western Scientific and Classical Liberal Humanism intellectual framework enough to grapple with such a claim by Totalitarians. For my definitions and reason is rooted in that Enlightenment mode of thought. I have the same trouble with religions. I shall leave it to you professionals to work this out, and eagerly await reading more about the solution of this baffling situation.
My politically Liberal Christian friends say that God is Good, and therefore anything that is not Good is not from God. My Conservative Christian friends say that God is Good, and that everything that God wants us to do is therefore Good. And they all wonder why I left Christianity! LOL!
Mark, your counter to my Nazi example holds only if you adopt a cosmopolitan perspective. Which requires further philosophical assumptions. Which means, again, that cooperation is only one factor of what is going on. I could easily imagine a worldwide ant-like society where cooperation is maximized at the expense of individual flourishing. I’d call that a nightmare.
In general I don’t hold to any nest separation of philosophy and science, btw. To me it’s about properly combining good reasoning and empirical evidence.
As for imperatives, I thought I made it clear that I’m talking about conditional, not absolute ones.
Massimo, you are entirely right that my counter requires a cosmopolitan perspective – that “others” are worthy of full moral regard. You have brought up another aspect of morality (the size of the circle of moral concern) where science is essentially silent and philosophy (or logical thinking) must be our guide.
Criticizing the science I have asserted here for a lack of definition of ultimate moral goals and who is in the circle of moral concern does not hit the science, it just emphasizes where help from philosophers is required for developing full moral systems.
And right, you have been clear that the moral system you favor is based on conditional oughts. My question was about what “moral” refers to more generally, if you favor a different definition than Mackie used in support of anti-realism. But I think I understand you.
I agree that our ultimate moral goals (where science is essentially silent except that those goals are not obtained by exploiting others – thus creating cooperation problems) and the size of our circle of moral concern are most coherently based on conditional oughts.
However, the objectivity of science has a more robust quality than the objectivity of conditional oughts. An objective understanding of the function of cultural moral norms (the principle reason they exist) is a powerful reference for resolving many disputes about those moral norms. Understanding those norms as conditional oughts is not so powerful.
But where science is silent, understanding morality as conditional oughts is the most coherent, useful approach I know of.
Mark, I’m not sure what you mean by “powerful.” They are what they are. Morality is not science, so the two differ. Again, I never claimed that moral objectivity is on par with the laws of natural science. That would be moral realism, which I reject.
Why is science silente on cosmopolitanism? I think there is empirical evidence that if we acted cooperatively at a global level we wouldn’t have problems like inequality, climate change, war, and so forth. All of which are moral problems.
Understanding cultural moral norms as parts of cooperation strategies is “powerful” in the sense of being effective and efficient at resolving many moral disputes.
For example, understanding cultural moral norms as parts of cooperation strategies is “powerful” in resolving disputes about 1) when it would be moral or immoral to follow the Golden Rule or enforce marker strategies such as “don’t eat shellfish” and 2) what interactions between groups are moral and immoral. Virtue ethics or conditional ought arguments for groups (or other moral systems) could be used to address these disputes, but less efficiently and less convincingly.
The proper science of morality as I know it is the study of the origins and function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense. If we are not talking about the origins and function of moral norms and our moral sense, then good science is silent. Science is silent on many important ethical questions as I described and is certainly silent on what we imperatively ought to do. Science can provide insights on how we might trigger our biology to motivate and maintain cooperation (even on a global scale) to achieve our goals, but only as instrumental oughts.
If science is silent on what we imperatively ought to do and we also stick with Mackie’s understanding of “moral” referring to imperative oughts, then science cannot support moral realism. All else being equal, moral anti-realism would remain the logical conclusion.
But this leads to a contradiction. The above moral anti-realism conclusion is contradicted by science’s ability to tell us the truth of some moral claims based on objective features of our universe - the cooperation problems that cultural moral norms and our moral sense solve. The ultimate source of this incoherence is the unfortunate understanding of the word “moral” as referring to imperative oughts, whose existence is an illusion.
Your interaction is helpful and appreciated. Thanks.
The moral quasi-realism approach has a lot to commend it. But there is an interesting question that comes out of considering the analogy between ethics and health that applies to virtue ethics. I am thinking here of eudaimonistic virtue ethics. Let's use the term eudaimonia to refer to human welfare and flourishing as the end goal of ethics. This compares to the notion of good health as an end goal. The problem arises: how do you define eudaimonia? Or for that matter, how do you define health? The ethical definition can be given in terms of the virtues and our instrumentality - how we work towards eudaimonia. The analogy to health is pretty clear: you are healthy if you have a sound mind in a sound body, and this can be measured in terms of a number of physiological and psychological "virtues".
It may be that there is not, and will never be, a good definition of either health or eudaimonia. They are moving targets. Aristotle passed away at the ripe old age of 62, which says that he was probably very healthy for a dude in his era. But that just does not cut it anymore. The same goes for how much eudaimonia is optimal. Is there a maximum value, so to speak? This kind of kicks the moral relativism question up a level. I really have a lot of problems with moral relativism, but we have to be careful in defining quasi-realism without begging the question.
To get a sense of what I am referring to, compare mathematics. About a century ago, Godel's Incompleteness Theorem put Hilbert's program of fully specifying mathematics out of reach. But that does not make our mathematical caluculations non-real and subjective. Instead, it implies that our ultimate goals, be they health or eudaimonia, are provisional, and relative to the current state of affairs we live in. In essence, this is the axiom set we live in, what is worthy (axios).
I think that it is safe to say that both medicine and morality are open-ended disciplines. I have my doubts that physics will ever find a Theory of Everything. Similarly, I doubt that you can come up with an ultimate definition of a healthy life or a complete list of the Vistues.
Anthony, while I agree that more empirical research will help us refine our concepts of physical health and eudaimonia (the latter of which I define as a life worth living), I don't think there is much room for subjectivity there.
Health is a matter of biological parameters, which--though variable in the human population--are objective. It's not a matter of how long you live, primarily, it's a matter of whether your physiological and anatomical systems are working properly. And biologists and medical researchers have a pretty good idea of what that means.
The case of eudaimonia is a bit more complicated, of course, because we are talking about human psychology. Nevertheless, there is increasing research in social and personal psychology that shows clearly what a good human life does and does not consist of. Ultimately, for instance, I think both Epicureanism and Stoicism are incomplete, because it turns out that a good human life needs *both* a certain amount of pleasure and the sort of meaningful existence that springs from acting virtuously (i.e., prosocially). I'm working on a book about this with two friends of mine, Greg Lopez and Meredith Kunz, so stay tuned.
Massimo, although I have great respect for your viewpoint, this is another case where I respectfully disagree. I am thinking about something much deeper and more fundamental than simply empirically refining our concepts.
I think that what this comes down to is what we think of the Solomonic pronouncement that "there is nothing new under the sun". As someone who grew up on science fiction, I think Shlomo had it wrong.
The ancient philosophies developed in an era where there was little change from generation to generation. This led to a belief in timeless wisdom. You see this also in Taoism which talks about cycles. But a better way of looking at things is in terms of a helix. The earth does not return to the same place it was every winter solstice, since it spirals through a path around the galaxy. Similarly, my daughter and grand-daughter's lives are fundamentally different from mine.
My Religious Naturalism friends use the concept of evolution as a mythos to structure their world-view. They refer to the principle of emergence - new things, concepts and ways of being that are qualitatively different from what came before.
You refer to health as a matter of biological parameters and state that these parameters are objective. But parameters themselves are conceptual structures that mediate and interpret the facts of reality. The biological parameters of the ancients were the humors. But new parameters emerged, such as Pasteur's germ theory of disease, and these new parameters have drastically changed the way we think of health. Nowadays we talk of genomics, epigenetics, gene regulatory networks, immunology and so on. It is not just having a "pretty good idea". There is something more fundamental going on: the ideas are changing and new ideas are emerging.
To use the example of mathematics, there is more to mathematics nowadays than geometry and the elementary number theory of the ancients. We have Cartesian geometry, calculus, formal logic, algorithms, group theory, graph theory, measure theory and probability theory.
So quasi-realism in ethics has a fundamental problem: eudaimonia as defined as a life worth living cannot be pinned down. It is in a state of flux, since new ways of living are constantly emerging. You are looking at the research in social and personal psychology statically and claiming that it fleshes out the nature of what a good human life is. But the fundamental nature of what is a good life is changing and evolving. Any static notion of virtues is incomplete because of this. It is not enough to tweak the balance between pleasure and prosocial action. There is a more basic problem that completely new and original virtues are arising due to the emergence of new ways of being and doing. There is something new under the sun.
You mentioned Sommers use of the analogy between ethics and health. I have another analogy that I use often: ethics is very similar to architecture in how it affects our lives. This analogy is also used by Graham, Haidt and Nosek in Moral Foundations Theory. The point is that there are completely new principles of architecture that are evolving and emerging all the time. It is simplistic to say that architecture is just about putting a roof over our heads. Objective reality may be still atoms and molecules, but the way we think about them and put them together is completely different. The principles and practices of architecture have evolved.
Similarly, ethics has evolved. There are new virtues arising all the time that cannot be reduced to the old ones. To take a recent example, there are fundamental virtues of truth and honesty. But recent work in AI and large language models are presenting fundamentally new questions about what these virtues are. The new ways of dealing with these issues cannot be reduced to the classical virtues without contorting them into a Procrustian bed of interpretation. Instead, we have to acknowledge that the conceptual ontology of virtues is growing and changing.
Anthony, there is, of course, no problem with disagreeing!
That said, I don’t think there is much fundamentally new under the sun. Human nature is the same as it was two or three millennia ago. We still want and fear the same things. Which is why ancient philosophy and religion are still useful.
It is perfectly possible to define eudaimonia in empirical terms. It has to do with three components: relationships, meaningful projects, and pleasure. That has not changed since the time of Aristotle.
Your own example of AI makes clear that there is nothing new as far as human needs and wants are concerned. AI presents new challenges, but to what? To the very same human needs and wants.
A well written and stimulating article as always. Many thanks. My only comment is that we’d do well to simply jettison the siren song of objectivity when it comes to ethics. It doesn’t exist (quasi or otherwise). When we play that game, we lose the argument before it even starts. Instead, it’s best to stick to a relativistic framework - because it’s true - but don’t concede that relativism requires that we stop with “no objectivity means anything goes” a la Dostoevsky. There is nothing which “objectively” determines or mechanically drives us to a singular transcendent outcome (this isn’t math or science). That said, only the most stubborn and dogmatic counterparty would say there is no basis on which to make reasoned and appropriate judgments (“anything goes” relativism). That basis is reason. And it’s also entirely fair for us to say - using reason - that those judgments can be applicable in virtually every circumstance to virtually all people WITHOUT being “objective.” It’s the beauty of Virtue Ethics - to me, once you’ve jettisoned the notion of the logos and all the metaphysics with its attendant finery, it’s the singular reason to subscribe to that ethical philosophy. It gives us the tools to muscularly navigate what is indeed a relativistic universe using reason and rationality, and simple common sense.
David, we might disagree only in language, not substance. I think, for instance, that murder is objectively bad for social animals, which is why it’s rare even among other primates. But that doesn’t mean that it’s a universal law, since not all animals are social. In fact, only a small minority are.
When you say that we can use reason to settle our disputes, I agree. But reason itself is based on objective standards, no? Like what makes for sound / unsound or valid / invalid argument.
Why are you making me think so hard on a Friday afternoon, Massimo? I think that’s objectively unreasonable of you ;-)
I agree on your first point. By my read, what you wrote, substantively, is consistent with my comment.
I do think there are objective standards by which reason can be evaluated as a tool or technique or method. Like if I say, “A horse can run. And a person can run. So a horse is a person.” (Which, by the way, is my take on most of Socrates’s dialogues… ). We can say that’s faulty logic, objectively speaking. And dismantle it accordingly.
But when you use the tool, apply it to a situational context, I think you are floating freely. So even murder. There are plenty of scenarios where rational people, applying reason and logic soundly, can disagree on whether it was “right” or “wrong.” Our legal system (theoretically) works this way. The facts are articulated (what happened). Precedents are marshaled (intending to show society’s current position and prior judgments on similar cases). Both sides make an argument. And a judge reaches a decision. Your guy Cicero was excellent at the practice.
Now of course there are times when the system breaks down due to bias or ignorance. Or where emotion or unreasonable arguments are leveraged to drive a result which may not be properly reasonable. For sure. But my point is that there are plenty of scenarios where both sides present their arguments in entirely sound and reasonable ways, and an adjudicator, acting reasonably, picks one. Is it objectively right? I would say no. It’s a decision that’s made provisionally and circumstantially, grounded in facts and context. It may hold for a while. It may change later as society evolves.
But I don’t think conclusions like this, whether reached within the law or within our basic day to day, are ever objectively right or true, insofar as there as a determination which is fundamentally mandated and dictated, an outcome which is objectively and absolutely required.
We make these conditional treaties and provisional deals between and amongst ourselves all the time, at a frequency which is astonishing. That’s what I find so amazing. That in the absence of a truly objective framework or set of laws, in the presence of an empty whiteboard, we somehow manage to keep it all together.
David, apologies for the thinking tour de force on a Friday afternoon... I may agree it's not reasonable, but you are engaging in it of your "free will," so to speak.
Regarding your example of murder, I may agree that in specific cases both sides of the argument are reasonable, though I really don't think there are a lot of those cases. But that may simply be because somewhere there is either faulty reasoning (which may be discovered later) or lack of sufficient empirical information (which may become available later).
Bu that murder, defined as the killing of a fellow human being for gain or pleasure or at random is objectively wrong for a social species because a society that allowed it would very quickly crumble and because it objectively decreases the ability of members of that society to flourish and pursuit their projects.
IF (Foot's conditional imperative) we care about flourishing and society THEN murder is objectively, unequivocally wrong.
There are constraints, corrective feedback loops, evolved behaviors, and variations over time/place for living systems. We, as social mammals, are wired to seek group survival and well-being. Some philosophers place responsibility on the clan/tribe/society rather than on the individual. Deviants are corrected for the common good. Rather than look to absolutes or ideologies, socio-biology seems to me a better source to suss out guidelines for behavior. (am a old time amateur, so forgive any terminology errors)
Steven, I think responsibility is always individual, but of course groups are made of individuals.
As for sociobiology, that particular approach has developed a bad reputation for engaging in simplistic explanations of human behavior. But if you mean that we need to keep in mind the fact that we are social animals, yes, absolutely.
Thanks for your reply, Massimo. Do you think individual responsibility applies to other species, or just to humans? Also, where do you stand on free will ? Caruso and G. Strawson are two well known philosophers who deny it exists, relieving individuals of responsibility to varying degrees.
Steven, I don't think the concept of moral responsibility can be applied to other species because I think it requires explicit conscious reasoning about ethical matters. So far as we know, no other species on earth is capable of that. Of course, that's an empirical question, so my answer may be revised according to new evidence.
As for free will, I'm a compatibilist, like Den Dennett, the Stoics, and the majority of modern practicing philosophers. Yes, everything happens as result of cause-effect, but we are not marionettes in the thralls of the universe, because part of that cause-effect is internal to us and goes through us. We make decisions, and those decisions are "ours" insofar as they result at least in part from our brain, which contains our decision-making machinery in its fronto-parietal lobes.
Massimo, Last question on this topic. Agreed that we make decisions all the time. If embodied, physical conditions including the brain are the result of heredity (genes, epigenes, viruses, microbiome, prions, +?) and cumulative (embodied/physical) experiences since conception, and one encounters present external reality resulting in an action (or omission), where is the 'ghost in the machine' at work taking ownership? Consciousness? (the hard problem) Awareness is a physical process (caloric), and rationalization after the event has been tested scientifically.
I don’t think I ever mentioned any ghost in the machine. That wouldn’t be compatibilism. But surely there is a difference between you raising your hand of your own volition vs someone forcing it up, yes?
That was just an amateur metaphor from my ancient studies. Of course there is a difference between coerced actions and freely executed ones. However causation is at work in all cases I'm aware of.
Great article has had me thinking all morning & debating with my wife. Ethics is good for mental health & the spectrum varies from simple day to day interactions with your fellow being to the extreme of exploiting people. Unfortunately society at large has lost its moral compass. Anyway thank you for your article.
This is an article I will return to again and again to keep my thoughts clear and arguments ready. It's that all important "if / ought"; (if you want to be healthy, then you ought to eat healthy food) that should guide our choices and actions and not some dictate (cultural , political or religious). Thanks for a great article.
You're welcome. Yes, I do find the idea that ethics is analogous to health and based on what Philippa Foot called "conditional imperatives" (if...then) very powerful.
I wish you had included the term "conditional imperative" in your article. I know the term, but it had slipped my mind. I find it a powerful short hand way to sum up the if / ought way of thinking about ethics and to counter people who start talking about Kant.
I think we've been here before. We say that X is unethical because it leads to up consequence Y. If our opponent is for example a free market ideologue, they will maintain that free-market policies the best way to achieve the human flourishing that we both desire, and we have a disagreement about facts. On the other hand, if our opponent maintains that the only thing that really matters is getting people to accept Christ as their personal saviour (and I come across this argument all the time as I follow the creationist literature), I see no resolution by argument.
What would you say of Tom Sawyer, who really believes that helping Jim escape is a damnable sin, but feels moved to do it anyway?
Hej Paul, I don't know about Tom Sawyer, but it seems to me that you have "facts" in your arguments with both the free-market ideologue and the creationist. I was trying to imagine what facts you would use in arguments with the former. Perhaps that it is statistically evident that many people do not flourish in a free-market? With the second there are the facts that many people have suffered abuse by the church ie through accepting Christ. Both your ideologues are probably not open to persuasion by rational means; it will take something to happen before they change their views. However, you have the skills to seek out the "facts" to help you avoid falling into traps of conspiracy theorists and others. Keep them sharp!
Let's also not forget that nothing hinges on people accepting or not accepting certain (sound) arguments. Half of Americans reject evolution. They are just wrong.
Sorry Massimo, I think there is an awful lot wrong with not accepting sound arguments; much hinges on it. People who reject evolution are wrong. In itself this is arguably morally neutral, but rejecting evolution often leads people to hold other beliefs that lead them to act in immoral ways, if by immoral we mean hindering others flourishing, doing harm. Denial of the facts, for instance of climate change is not morally neutral in my view.
Indeed. And there is a clear link between thinking that evolution is wrong because God did everything, and thinking that we don't need to worry about climate change because God looks after everything. By clear, I mean what's in the creationist literature, and the fact that all the openly creationist institutions repeatedly quote God's pledge to Noah after the Flood to prove their point. This is I think rhetorically important, even if it is philosophically trivial that incorrect factual beliefs will lead to bad decisions.
Patricia, sorry for not being clear. When I said “nothing hinges on…” I meant that just because some people do not accept sound arguments it doesn’t mean that’s proof that the arguments are wrong or even debatable.
Paul, as you say, in the case of the free market ideologue the disagreement is, at least in part, about facts. So we can settle that empirically.
In the case of the religious person, it is primarily philosophical. We could argue, for instance, that there is no sound reason to think that accepting Christ is something one ought to do. Of course he will respond that it's a matter of faith. At which point the discussion is terminated by one of the participants having changed the rules (from philosophical debate to accepting things by faith).
As for Tom Sawyer, I'd say his moral feelings are clearly superior to his faith.
I have been thinking that there needs to be a component of personal relativism or moral skepticism in any moral theory that we ought to consider. That being, "maybe we're wrong". Both in the present and in the future, by which I mean on reflection.
I am a layman so maybe this is old ground but I am surprised I haven't come across it. Any thoughts or sign posts are appreciated!
Matt, yes, we should absolutely always keep in mind that we could be wrong. But I wouldn't call that relativism. It's skepticism. Specifically the kind of skepticism advocated by people like Carneades and Cicero.
I've published a few essays on that approach right here at FiW. Check out these:
https://figsinwinter.substack.com/p/profiles-in-skepticism-carneades
https://figsinwinter.substack.com/p/how-to-assess-the-probability-of
https://figsinwinter.substack.com/p/the-importance-of-doubting
Hi Massimo, very much enjoyed the article and helpful references. I have a question about the structure of the argument. If one doesn't accept the axiom in the IF statement (e.g. caring about human welfare, say a Stalin) then there are not any facts (e.g. human welfare) to reason about. Is this correct? If so, then are we not back to relativism? Or alternatively, is it the case that only agreement on starting axioms result in agreement of moral facts?
Mark, if Staling rejects the axiom then our only choice is to resist him. As people have, in fact done. I don't think that slides us back into relativism because there is mounting evidence that prosocial behavior is built into our genes, which makes sense since we are a highly social species. So rejecting the axioms is equivalent to rejecting nature herself, always a perilous proposition.
You keep on teaching me. Thanks.
Glad you are here my friend.
I think though it’s worth keeping in mind that in contexts like war, manslaughter, self-defense, etc., the rightness or wrongness is certainly debatable and not subject to purely objective standards or rules, and it also seems to me that concepts like gain, pleasure and randomness are also inherently subjective.
I was thinking about this discussion last night, and a related scenario which came to mind which I think illustrates the issue well is, of course, the trolley problem (I know, I know…). It’s a situation which does involve killing. And where you could have Epicurus, Aristotle, Bentham and Kant all evaluating the rightness and wrongness of the various permutations and each reaching a different conclusion, all the while applying perfect reason and logic. And even within schools of thought, you could see Chrysippus, Epictetus and Seneca all reaching different conclusions too, depending on the facts and circumstances.
Reason is like English, or a level. It’s a tool with its own internal rules and processes, and it can be evaluated and judged on that basis. Perhaps we could call that internal objectivity. I would be objectively mistaken if I spelled “Stoic” as “Sgdfgfdghd.” But when we apply those tools in any given situation, we bring to bear values, priorities, facts, perspectives, circumstances, etc that are ultimately subjective, or if objective (like a fact) are interpreted through a subjective lens. Our reason helps us analyze the inputs, and generate a range of outputs which it then helps us rank and ultimately take us to a choice or decision. And I think you are right that in so so many cases, there is so much enormous and persuasive consensus that it can feel “objective.” But I would still contend that it is not.
I am tempted in cases like this to dismiss the conversation entirely and say, we agree on substance, and practically speaking, there is no real daylight between our positions. And that this is just an academic and irrelevant discussion. But I don’t think it is. I think it’s really important that we stare the reality in the face and wrestle with it. And that’s that we are floating in a disenchanted universe with no a priori or transcendent - or objective - demands or rules when it comes to ethics - or morals - and it’s the human project to figure that out.
It’s why I enjoy your writing so much. You are not afraid to follow your training as both a scientist and a philosopher to its ultimate and logical conclusions, even if those positions may be shocking and rattling to many - and in their own way, anti-social. It’s how we get out of the cave. And I really appreciate and value the work you do on that front.
David, thanks for the kind words, much appreciated!
But (you knew there was a but, right?), objectivity is not synonymous with cosmic transcendence. I am not claiming that there are laws of morality similar to the laws of nature uncovered by science. That would be moral relativism.
But there definitely are objective moral standards that apply not just to humans, but to any intelligent social animal. That’s why theft is punished among bonobos and murder is rare in any primate species.
Yes, different schools of thought disagree, though I don’t think they disagree as much as people often think. But disagreement is not evidence of anything other than disagreement. People can disagree because they are wrong, not because there is no fact of the matter.
Do you evaluate the behavior of other primates against objective moral standards? If one Bonobo steals from another, and is punished, that’s certainly a function of sociocultural utility, but would you say that it represents the violation of an objective moral standard? If so, who or what defines that? If not, then when, at what stage, or for what reason do you separate Homo Sapiens from other primates in this regard? My personal view is that there are no objective moral standards, it’s all sociocultural utility, and that’s inherently malleable and dynamic over time and place and circumstance - for all primates (and I suppose any creature with some sort of higher intellectual functioning). We just have the benefit of advanced language, advanced reason - and opposable thumbs. Which allows us to consider these issues more dimensionally, and build more elaborate societies as a consequence. But regardless, it’s all happening in white space.
If a bonobo steals from another it is violating the same objective moral standard as if you or I were stealing from another. Because stealing objectively, empirically undermine group harmony and individual flourishing. The difference between the bonobo and us is that he is not aware of the ethical nature of the violation, because he cannot articulate that kind of thought. Nevertheless, he will be punished by other bonobos if caught.
Thank you for another thoughtful and thought provoking article. It seems, as usual, the extremes on both sides are wrong and the truth is found somewhere between them. I think of myself as a moral pluralist; that a minimum amount of a kind of “moral realism” can be loosely defined on practical grounds as a framework for individual freedom. I just don’t believe that it is metaphysical and true for all people at all times.
I’m not a moral relativist because I think morality is social, and therefore things that are antisocial are not moral. (Again, what’s antisocial isn’t defined metaphysically, but practically within a society.) Morality differs from virtue in part because if I am stranded alone on an island, I can still be virtuous, but there are no one to interact with. Morality doesn’t seem to exist with out social interaction. Am I wrong or misunderstanding something?
Bob, sounds about right to me! The only caveat is that I’d suggest some moral rules are valid for all human beings. Like no stealing and no murdering. But they are not universal in any metaphysical sense of the term.
Agreed. This is where the Stoic idea of living according to human nature, i.e. as a social creature. I like the Buddhist concept of “interbeeing”. We are not fully human outside of our social context. Even in isolation, I will continue living in the context of a self identity created by prior social experience.
Murder is wrongful killing, stealing is wrongful possession (or dispossession). Murder and theft are universally recognized as immoral. But right on wrong are opinions we develop in society.
Totalitarianism is beyond the pale because it erases the boundaries between public and private life. I’m left, as a layman, with opinions
You seem to be hedging your bets here. You agree that murder and theft are wrong, but then you say that right and wrong are opinions. They are not. Murder and theft are wrong (for social, intelligent animals, if we care about social harmony and individual flourishing) period, regardless of what anyone’s opinion is.
My wording was sloppy and unclear. What I intended to say is that we can all agree that murder is wrong, but disagree about what constitutes murder. I have loved ones who believe any abortion at any time regardless of the circumstances is murder, even if the mother risks her own death. I have loved ones who believe that if a mother dies because she is forced by the government to carry a non-viable pregnancy to a still birth, that is murder. This is an example of the opinions I speak of.
Agreeing murder is wrong is only a starting point, we have to determine and agree about what constitutes a murder.
Ah yes! Indeed, that's actually a good example of what Cicero and Seneca are talking about when they say that Nature gives us the beginnings of wisdom, but we need reason to build on it.
Nature tells us that murder is wrong. Then we have to reason our way to what does and does not count as murder.
True indeed! I haven't made as much progress in the last sixty years sorting this out. Perhaps nature will grant me another sixty, and I'll finally be a sage! I'm going to continue working on it, until then. Thanks as always.
Massimo,
Thanks for an insightful discussion of moral values and moral objectivity.
I see another possibility for understanding what is objectively moral.
If we use the right definitions of moral and immoral, a science based moral equivalent of the law of gravity is possible.
Specifically,
• Behaviors that solve cooperation problems are ‘moral’.
• Behaviors that create cooperation problems are ‘immoral’.
Here, ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’
• Refer to behaviors consistent with or contradictory to the primary reason cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist – they solve cooperation problems.
• And do NOT refer to any imperative obligations or “What everyone ought do regardless of their needs and preferences” (Mackie identified the existence of such things as impossibly strange and Michael Ruse identifies them as “illusions foisted on us by our genes”).
Whether or not there is a science based moral equivalent of the law of gravity depends on how we define the word moral. If “moral” is defined as imperative obligations, then it is impossible for the reasons Mackie described. But if “moral” is defined (as science suggests) as consistent with the primary reason cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist, then deriving a science based moral equivalent of the law of gravity is straightforward using the normal methods of science.
We are free to make philosophical definitions of moral and immoral however we think will be most useful or coherent. Will the functional definition be more culturally useful and philosophically coherent? I expect so. It should be easy to be more useful and coherent than the imperative ought definition which describes something that exists only as an illusion.
The idea that we could philosophically define moral behaviors as those consistent with the primary reason cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist (their function) seems to me an idea worth discussion.
Mark, if it were so easy to come up with the ethical equivalent of a law of gravity I would have expected people to have done it by now. And yet...
I don't think cooperation is the ultimate standard. The Nazi cooperated very effectively with each other, and yet we don't think they acted morally.
The problem that morality has to solve is how to make human beings act prosocially (which includes cooperation) while at the same time being able to pursue their own projects and interests, within certain limits (i.e., limits that do not infringe on others' freedom to pursue their own projects and interests).
That's why it's complicated, and that's why you need both empirical input (science, especially social science) and good reasoning (philosophy).
Massimo, thanks for your comment.
Regarding Nazis, in addition to cooperating, they were cooperating to exploit others and thereby creating cooperation problems. Creating cooperation problems is contradictory to the function of cultural moral norms and therefore immoral by the above claimed principles. The inconsistency with our intuitions regarding Nazis you mention does not exist.
I also disagree that the above implies that good philosophy would no longer be required to answer our questions about morality.
While clear about what moral ‘means’ ‘are’, the science of morality is almost silent regarding the goals of moral behavior. And this science is similarly silent on important aspects of the broader ethical questions “What is good?”, “How should I live?”, and “What are my obligations?”
Answering such ethical questions goes well beyond the domain of science. I see the above moral principles from science illuminating our understanding of virtue ethics and consequentialist moral theories, not contradicting them.
Am I understanding you correctly that you see no reasons to seek an alternative to philosophical definitions of “moral” based on an illusion – behaviors that are something like imperative obligations?
The Nazis, and other religious or secular totalitarians, seem to me to be outside of what I understand as morality. If morality is a system that allows individuals to work out right and wrong in their social interactions and obligations, then it seems to me that totalitarianisms replace morality with a system of thought that eliminates the boundary between individuals and society. Instead of moral reasoning of the individual, the "correct" thought in totalitarianism is how to best participate in and advance the greater narrative of the society. The leader embodies the will of the society, so each person is no longer an individual morally, but an agent of society's will.
Bob, ask yourself if Nazi, religious, or secular totalitarian supporters (average people in the populace) would agree that “Do to others as you would have them do to you” is generally reliable moral guidance. I expect they will. If they do, then they are fully within the fold of their moral ‘means’ being defined by Morality as Cooperation Strategies.
We would still disagree with them about limitations (perhaps dictated by the persuasive autocrat) about who is in the “circle of moral concern” (Peter Singer’s phrase) and deserves full moral concern and who deserves less or no moral concern as ‘enemies’ or ‘threats’ (and other ‘races’ for the Nazi example).
We would also disagree with them about the ultimate goals (ends) of moral behavior, again as perhaps dictated by the persuasive autocrat.
So, we would disagree about the circle of moral concern and the ultimate goals of moral behavior, but their moral means are still firmly in the same domain as ours. To maintain cooperative societies, it is a necessity that the society’s morality (or laws if they have no morality) solves cooperation problems.
Modern autocrats commonly appear to be psychopaths (people with no conscience or empathy). And the strong hierarchical structures they typically impose attract psychopaths. While psychopaths would recognize the Golden Rule, it would not occur to them that they were under any obligation to follow it. Psychopath's personal rules for interacting with other people are outside what we would understand as morality.
Mark, I still don't see how your exclusive focus on cooperation gets you out of the Nazi objection. Or, for that matter, how it accounts for a lot of what we consider moral / immoral behavior. As I said, cooperation is part of the picture for sure, but it's not sufficient (though I suspect it's necessary).
Massimo, Morality as Cooperation Strategies gets out of the Nazi problem by recognizing that the morality of a behavior’s means must be judged separately from the ends of that behavior.
Past and present cultural moral norms are virtually all parts of cooperation strategies. There is a fact of the matter that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems that are objective parts of our universe (that are as innate to our universe as the logic and mathematics that define them). Whether a behavior is consistent with or contradicts the universal function of culturally moral ‘means’ provides an objective reference for right and wrong behavior grounded in objective aspects of our universe.
There is no universal function for the ‘ends’ of the cooperation that moral behaviors enable; people cooperate to accomplish whatever they can agree on. The morality of ‘ends’ must be judged separately.
Within their circle of moral concern, Nazis morally cooperated by following the Golden Rule and other moral norms as moral means but cooperated with the immoral ends of exploiting (causing cooperation problems for) people outside the Nazi circle of moral concern.
You are right, of course. Most people are highly moral in this sense, if they are dealing with an ingroup member. I know racist MAGA people who are gracious and giving to me and others who fit their idea of the right kind of American. The kind of Totalitarian I am talking about is the true believer (to use Eric Hoffer's term). He or she would gladly give their own life to advance the cause. Is therefore taking the life of others for the sake of the cause moral under the Golden Rule?
Bob,
First, let’s review the general case for determining when it is right or wrong to follow the Golden Rule or virtually any other cultural moral norm (from a Morality as Cooperation Strategies perspective), then a specific case that may be illuminating.
The function of cultural moral norms is solving cooperation problems. If circumstances are such that following the norm will solve a cooperation problem, then following the norm in those circumstances is objectively right (moral) in our universe. In circumstances when following the norm will create a cooperation problem, then it is objectively wrong (immoral) in our universe.
An example: A critical part of maintaining cooperation within an army and achieving the army’s goals is the moral norm of soldiers accepting commands from higher ranking officers that will certainly get some of them killed. The existence of an organized hierarchy is an important part of what makes it morally acceptable to send other people in harm’s way to serve the greater good.
Without the organized hierarchy, people spontaneously causing the death of someone willing to die for the cause would lead to chaos, cause cooperation problems, and be immoral. With this organized hierarchy, causing the death of someone willing to die for the cause solves the cooperation problem of “Who will risk their lives for the cause” and would be moral.
The Golden Rule is a usually reliable, but fallible, heuristic for initiating reciprocity. It is not a moral absolute and the morality of following it depends on circumstances.
Bob, and yet even the Nazi claim to follow a kind of morality. Which is why I keep thinking that Socrates was right when he said that unwisdom is the root of all evil.
Perhaps I cannot escape my Western Scientific and Classical Liberal Humanism intellectual framework enough to grapple with such a claim by Totalitarians. For my definitions and reason is rooted in that Enlightenment mode of thought. I have the same trouble with religions. I shall leave it to you professionals to work this out, and eagerly await reading more about the solution of this baffling situation.
My politically Liberal Christian friends say that God is Good, and therefore anything that is not Good is not from God. My Conservative Christian friends say that God is Good, and that everything that God wants us to do is therefore Good. And they all wonder why I left Christianity! LOL!
No kidding!
Mark, your counter to my Nazi example holds only if you adopt a cosmopolitan perspective. Which requires further philosophical assumptions. Which means, again, that cooperation is only one factor of what is going on. I could easily imagine a worldwide ant-like society where cooperation is maximized at the expense of individual flourishing. I’d call that a nightmare.
In general I don’t hold to any nest separation of philosophy and science, btw. To me it’s about properly combining good reasoning and empirical evidence.
As for imperatives, I thought I made it clear that I’m talking about conditional, not absolute ones.
Massimo, you are entirely right that my counter requires a cosmopolitan perspective – that “others” are worthy of full moral regard. You have brought up another aspect of morality (the size of the circle of moral concern) where science is essentially silent and philosophy (or logical thinking) must be our guide.
Criticizing the science I have asserted here for a lack of definition of ultimate moral goals and who is in the circle of moral concern does not hit the science, it just emphasizes where help from philosophers is required for developing full moral systems.
And right, you have been clear that the moral system you favor is based on conditional oughts. My question was about what “moral” refers to more generally, if you favor a different definition than Mackie used in support of anti-realism. But I think I understand you.
I agree that our ultimate moral goals (where science is essentially silent except that those goals are not obtained by exploiting others – thus creating cooperation problems) and the size of our circle of moral concern are most coherently based on conditional oughts.
However, the objectivity of science has a more robust quality than the objectivity of conditional oughts. An objective understanding of the function of cultural moral norms (the principle reason they exist) is a powerful reference for resolving many disputes about those moral norms. Understanding those norms as conditional oughts is not so powerful.
But where science is silent, understanding morality as conditional oughts is the most coherent, useful approach I know of.
Mark, I’m not sure what you mean by “powerful.” They are what they are. Morality is not science, so the two differ. Again, I never claimed that moral objectivity is on par with the laws of natural science. That would be moral realism, which I reject.
Why is science silente on cosmopolitanism? I think there is empirical evidence that if we acted cooperatively at a global level we wouldn’t have problems like inequality, climate change, war, and so forth. All of which are moral problems.
Understanding cultural moral norms as parts of cooperation strategies is “powerful” in the sense of being effective and efficient at resolving many moral disputes.
For example, understanding cultural moral norms as parts of cooperation strategies is “powerful” in resolving disputes about 1) when it would be moral or immoral to follow the Golden Rule or enforce marker strategies such as “don’t eat shellfish” and 2) what interactions between groups are moral and immoral. Virtue ethics or conditional ought arguments for groups (or other moral systems) could be used to address these disputes, but less efficiently and less convincingly.
The proper science of morality as I know it is the study of the origins and function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense. If we are not talking about the origins and function of moral norms and our moral sense, then good science is silent. Science is silent on many important ethical questions as I described and is certainly silent on what we imperatively ought to do. Science can provide insights on how we might trigger our biology to motivate and maintain cooperation (even on a global scale) to achieve our goals, but only as instrumental oughts.
If science is silent on what we imperatively ought to do and we also stick with Mackie’s understanding of “moral” referring to imperative oughts, then science cannot support moral realism. All else being equal, moral anti-realism would remain the logical conclusion.
But this leads to a contradiction. The above moral anti-realism conclusion is contradicted by science’s ability to tell us the truth of some moral claims based on objective features of our universe - the cooperation problems that cultural moral norms and our moral sense solve. The ultimate source of this incoherence is the unfortunate understanding of the word “moral” as referring to imperative oughts, whose existence is an illusion.
Your interaction is helpful and appreciated. Thanks.
The moral quasi-realism approach has a lot to commend it. But there is an interesting question that comes out of considering the analogy between ethics and health that applies to virtue ethics. I am thinking here of eudaimonistic virtue ethics. Let's use the term eudaimonia to refer to human welfare and flourishing as the end goal of ethics. This compares to the notion of good health as an end goal. The problem arises: how do you define eudaimonia? Or for that matter, how do you define health? The ethical definition can be given in terms of the virtues and our instrumentality - how we work towards eudaimonia. The analogy to health is pretty clear: you are healthy if you have a sound mind in a sound body, and this can be measured in terms of a number of physiological and psychological "virtues".
It may be that there is not, and will never be, a good definition of either health or eudaimonia. They are moving targets. Aristotle passed away at the ripe old age of 62, which says that he was probably very healthy for a dude in his era. But that just does not cut it anymore. The same goes for how much eudaimonia is optimal. Is there a maximum value, so to speak? This kind of kicks the moral relativism question up a level. I really have a lot of problems with moral relativism, but we have to be careful in defining quasi-realism without begging the question.
To get a sense of what I am referring to, compare mathematics. About a century ago, Godel's Incompleteness Theorem put Hilbert's program of fully specifying mathematics out of reach. But that does not make our mathematical caluculations non-real and subjective. Instead, it implies that our ultimate goals, be they health or eudaimonia, are provisional, and relative to the current state of affairs we live in. In essence, this is the axiom set we live in, what is worthy (axios).
I think that it is safe to say that both medicine and morality are open-ended disciplines. I have my doubts that physics will ever find a Theory of Everything. Similarly, I doubt that you can come up with an ultimate definition of a healthy life or a complete list of the Vistues.
Anthony, while I agree that more empirical research will help us refine our concepts of physical health and eudaimonia (the latter of which I define as a life worth living), I don't think there is much room for subjectivity there.
Health is a matter of biological parameters, which--though variable in the human population--are objective. It's not a matter of how long you live, primarily, it's a matter of whether your physiological and anatomical systems are working properly. And biologists and medical researchers have a pretty good idea of what that means.
The case of eudaimonia is a bit more complicated, of course, because we are talking about human psychology. Nevertheless, there is increasing research in social and personal psychology that shows clearly what a good human life does and does not consist of. Ultimately, for instance, I think both Epicureanism and Stoicism are incomplete, because it turns out that a good human life needs *both* a certain amount of pleasure and the sort of meaningful existence that springs from acting virtuously (i.e., prosocially). I'm working on a book about this with two friends of mine, Greg Lopez and Meredith Kunz, so stay tuned.
Massimo, although I have great respect for your viewpoint, this is another case where I respectfully disagree. I am thinking about something much deeper and more fundamental than simply empirically refining our concepts.
I think that what this comes down to is what we think of the Solomonic pronouncement that "there is nothing new under the sun". As someone who grew up on science fiction, I think Shlomo had it wrong.
The ancient philosophies developed in an era where there was little change from generation to generation. This led to a belief in timeless wisdom. You see this also in Taoism which talks about cycles. But a better way of looking at things is in terms of a helix. The earth does not return to the same place it was every winter solstice, since it spirals through a path around the galaxy. Similarly, my daughter and grand-daughter's lives are fundamentally different from mine.
My Religious Naturalism friends use the concept of evolution as a mythos to structure their world-view. They refer to the principle of emergence - new things, concepts and ways of being that are qualitatively different from what came before.
You refer to health as a matter of biological parameters and state that these parameters are objective. But parameters themselves are conceptual structures that mediate and interpret the facts of reality. The biological parameters of the ancients were the humors. But new parameters emerged, such as Pasteur's germ theory of disease, and these new parameters have drastically changed the way we think of health. Nowadays we talk of genomics, epigenetics, gene regulatory networks, immunology and so on. It is not just having a "pretty good idea". There is something more fundamental going on: the ideas are changing and new ideas are emerging.
To use the example of mathematics, there is more to mathematics nowadays than geometry and the elementary number theory of the ancients. We have Cartesian geometry, calculus, formal logic, algorithms, group theory, graph theory, measure theory and probability theory.
So quasi-realism in ethics has a fundamental problem: eudaimonia as defined as a life worth living cannot be pinned down. It is in a state of flux, since new ways of living are constantly emerging. You are looking at the research in social and personal psychology statically and claiming that it fleshes out the nature of what a good human life is. But the fundamental nature of what is a good life is changing and evolving. Any static notion of virtues is incomplete because of this. It is not enough to tweak the balance between pleasure and prosocial action. There is a more basic problem that completely new and original virtues are arising due to the emergence of new ways of being and doing. There is something new under the sun.
You mentioned Sommers use of the analogy between ethics and health. I have another analogy that I use often: ethics is very similar to architecture in how it affects our lives. This analogy is also used by Graham, Haidt and Nosek in Moral Foundations Theory. The point is that there are completely new principles of architecture that are evolving and emerging all the time. It is simplistic to say that architecture is just about putting a roof over our heads. Objective reality may be still atoms and molecules, but the way we think about them and put them together is completely different. The principles and practices of architecture have evolved.
Similarly, ethics has evolved. There are new virtues arising all the time that cannot be reduced to the old ones. To take a recent example, there are fundamental virtues of truth and honesty. But recent work in AI and large language models are presenting fundamentally new questions about what these virtues are. The new ways of dealing with these issues cannot be reduced to the classical virtues without contorting them into a Procrustian bed of interpretation. Instead, we have to acknowledge that the conceptual ontology of virtues is growing and changing.
Anthony, there is, of course, no problem with disagreeing!
That said, I don’t think there is much fundamentally new under the sun. Human nature is the same as it was two or three millennia ago. We still want and fear the same things. Which is why ancient philosophy and religion are still useful.
It is perfectly possible to define eudaimonia in empirical terms. It has to do with three components: relationships, meaningful projects, and pleasure. That has not changed since the time of Aristotle.
Your own example of AI makes clear that there is nothing new as far as human needs and wants are concerned. AI presents new challenges, but to what? To the very same human needs and wants.
A well written and stimulating article as always. Many thanks. My only comment is that we’d do well to simply jettison the siren song of objectivity when it comes to ethics. It doesn’t exist (quasi or otherwise). When we play that game, we lose the argument before it even starts. Instead, it’s best to stick to a relativistic framework - because it’s true - but don’t concede that relativism requires that we stop with “no objectivity means anything goes” a la Dostoevsky. There is nothing which “objectively” determines or mechanically drives us to a singular transcendent outcome (this isn’t math or science). That said, only the most stubborn and dogmatic counterparty would say there is no basis on which to make reasoned and appropriate judgments (“anything goes” relativism). That basis is reason. And it’s also entirely fair for us to say - using reason - that those judgments can be applicable in virtually every circumstance to virtually all people WITHOUT being “objective.” It’s the beauty of Virtue Ethics - to me, once you’ve jettisoned the notion of the logos and all the metaphysics with its attendant finery, it’s the singular reason to subscribe to that ethical philosophy. It gives us the tools to muscularly navigate what is indeed a relativistic universe using reason and rationality, and simple common sense.
David, we might disagree only in language, not substance. I think, for instance, that murder is objectively bad for social animals, which is why it’s rare even among other primates. But that doesn’t mean that it’s a universal law, since not all animals are social. In fact, only a small minority are.
When you say that we can use reason to settle our disputes, I agree. But reason itself is based on objective standards, no? Like what makes for sound / unsound or valid / invalid argument.
Why are you making me think so hard on a Friday afternoon, Massimo? I think that’s objectively unreasonable of you ;-)
I agree on your first point. By my read, what you wrote, substantively, is consistent with my comment.
I do think there are objective standards by which reason can be evaluated as a tool or technique or method. Like if I say, “A horse can run. And a person can run. So a horse is a person.” (Which, by the way, is my take on most of Socrates’s dialogues… ). We can say that’s faulty logic, objectively speaking. And dismantle it accordingly.
But when you use the tool, apply it to a situational context, I think you are floating freely. So even murder. There are plenty of scenarios where rational people, applying reason and logic soundly, can disagree on whether it was “right” or “wrong.” Our legal system (theoretically) works this way. The facts are articulated (what happened). Precedents are marshaled (intending to show society’s current position and prior judgments on similar cases). Both sides make an argument. And a judge reaches a decision. Your guy Cicero was excellent at the practice.
Now of course there are times when the system breaks down due to bias or ignorance. Or where emotion or unreasonable arguments are leveraged to drive a result which may not be properly reasonable. For sure. But my point is that there are plenty of scenarios where both sides present their arguments in entirely sound and reasonable ways, and an adjudicator, acting reasonably, picks one. Is it objectively right? I would say no. It’s a decision that’s made provisionally and circumstantially, grounded in facts and context. It may hold for a while. It may change later as society evolves.
But I don’t think conclusions like this, whether reached within the law or within our basic day to day, are ever objectively right or true, insofar as there as a determination which is fundamentally mandated and dictated, an outcome which is objectively and absolutely required.
We make these conditional treaties and provisional deals between and amongst ourselves all the time, at a frequency which is astonishing. That’s what I find so amazing. That in the absence of a truly objective framework or set of laws, in the presence of an empty whiteboard, we somehow manage to keep it all together.
Do you agree?
David, apologies for the thinking tour de force on a Friday afternoon... I may agree it's not reasonable, but you are engaging in it of your "free will," so to speak.
Regarding your example of murder, I may agree that in specific cases both sides of the argument are reasonable, though I really don't think there are a lot of those cases. But that may simply be because somewhere there is either faulty reasoning (which may be discovered later) or lack of sufficient empirical information (which may become available later).
Bu that murder, defined as the killing of a fellow human being for gain or pleasure or at random is objectively wrong for a social species because a society that allowed it would very quickly crumble and because it objectively decreases the ability of members of that society to flourish and pursuit their projects.
IF (Foot's conditional imperative) we care about flourishing and society THEN murder is objectively, unequivocally wrong.
There are constraints, corrective feedback loops, evolved behaviors, and variations over time/place for living systems. We, as social mammals, are wired to seek group survival and well-being. Some philosophers place responsibility on the clan/tribe/society rather than on the individual. Deviants are corrected for the common good. Rather than look to absolutes or ideologies, socio-biology seems to me a better source to suss out guidelines for behavior. (am a old time amateur, so forgive any terminology errors)
Steven, I think responsibility is always individual, but of course groups are made of individuals.
As for sociobiology, that particular approach has developed a bad reputation for engaging in simplistic explanations of human behavior. But if you mean that we need to keep in mind the fact that we are social animals, yes, absolutely.
Thanks for your reply, Massimo. Do you think individual responsibility applies to other species, or just to humans? Also, where do you stand on free will ? Caruso and G. Strawson are two well known philosophers who deny it exists, relieving individuals of responsibility to varying degrees.
Steven, I don't think the concept of moral responsibility can be applied to other species because I think it requires explicit conscious reasoning about ethical matters. So far as we know, no other species on earth is capable of that. Of course, that's an empirical question, so my answer may be revised according to new evidence.
As for free will, I'm a compatibilist, like Den Dennett, the Stoics, and the majority of modern practicing philosophers. Yes, everything happens as result of cause-effect, but we are not marionettes in the thralls of the universe, because part of that cause-effect is internal to us and goes through us. We make decisions, and those decisions are "ours" insofar as they result at least in part from our brain, which contains our decision-making machinery in its fronto-parietal lobes.
Massimo, Last question on this topic. Agreed that we make decisions all the time. If embodied, physical conditions including the brain are the result of heredity (genes, epigenes, viruses, microbiome, prions, +?) and cumulative (embodied/physical) experiences since conception, and one encounters present external reality resulting in an action (or omission), where is the 'ghost in the machine' at work taking ownership? Consciousness? (the hard problem) Awareness is a physical process (caloric), and rationalization after the event has been tested scientifically.
I don’t think I ever mentioned any ghost in the machine. That wouldn’t be compatibilism. But surely there is a difference between you raising your hand of your own volition vs someone forcing it up, yes?
That was just an amateur metaphor from my ancient studies. Of course there is a difference between coerced actions and freely executed ones. However causation is at work in all cases I'm aware of.
Cheers,
Steve
Great article has had me thinking all morning & debating with my wife. Ethics is good for mental health & the spectrum varies from simple day to day interactions with your fellow being to the extreme of exploiting people. Unfortunately society at large has lost its moral compass. Anyway thank you for your article.
Always happy to provide you with excuses to debate your wife... 😃
This is an article I will return to again and again to keep my thoughts clear and arguments ready. It's that all important "if / ought"; (if you want to be healthy, then you ought to eat healthy food) that should guide our choices and actions and not some dictate (cultural , political or religious). Thanks for a great article.
You're welcome. Yes, I do find the idea that ethics is analogous to health and based on what Philippa Foot called "conditional imperatives" (if...then) very powerful.
I wish you had included the term "conditional imperative" in your article. I know the term, but it had slipped my mind. I find it a powerful short hand way to sum up the if / ought way of thinking about ethics and to counter people who start talking about Kant.
Patricia, done! I've added a post-scriptum to the essay, with a link to Foot's original paper.
I think we've been here before. We say that X is unethical because it leads to up consequence Y. If our opponent is for example a free market ideologue, they will maintain that free-market policies the best way to achieve the human flourishing that we both desire, and we have a disagreement about facts. On the other hand, if our opponent maintains that the only thing that really matters is getting people to accept Christ as their personal saviour (and I come across this argument all the time as I follow the creationist literature), I see no resolution by argument.
What would you say of Tom Sawyer, who really believes that helping Jim escape is a damnable sin, but feels moved to do it anyway?
Hej Paul, I don't know about Tom Sawyer, but it seems to me that you have "facts" in your arguments with both the free-market ideologue and the creationist. I was trying to imagine what facts you would use in arguments with the former. Perhaps that it is statistically evident that many people do not flourish in a free-market? With the second there are the facts that many people have suffered abuse by the church ie through accepting Christ. Both your ideologues are probably not open to persuasion by rational means; it will take something to happen before they change their views. However, you have the skills to seek out the "facts" to help you avoid falling into traps of conspiracy theorists and others. Keep them sharp!
Let's also not forget that nothing hinges on people accepting or not accepting certain (sound) arguments. Half of Americans reject evolution. They are just wrong.
Sorry Massimo, I think there is an awful lot wrong with not accepting sound arguments; much hinges on it. People who reject evolution are wrong. In itself this is arguably morally neutral, but rejecting evolution often leads people to hold other beliefs that lead them to act in immoral ways, if by immoral we mean hindering others flourishing, doing harm. Denial of the facts, for instance of climate change is not morally neutral in my view.
Indeed. And there is a clear link between thinking that evolution is wrong because God did everything, and thinking that we don't need to worry about climate change because God looks after everything. By clear, I mean what's in the creationist literature, and the fact that all the openly creationist institutions repeatedly quote God's pledge to Noah after the Flood to prove their point. This is I think rhetorically important, even if it is philosophically trivial that incorrect factual beliefs will lead to bad decisions.
Agreed.
Patricia, sorry for not being clear. When I said “nothing hinges on…” I meant that just because some people do not accept sound arguments it doesn’t mean that’s proof that the arguments are wrong or even debatable.
I’m totally on board with your conception of the ethics of belief. You probably know this already, but here is my go-to on the subject: https://www.people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/Clifford_ethics.pdf
Paul, as you say, in the case of the free market ideologue the disagreement is, at least in part, about facts. So we can settle that empirically.
In the case of the religious person, it is primarily philosophical. We could argue, for instance, that there is no sound reason to think that accepting Christ is something one ought to do. Of course he will respond that it's a matter of faith. At which point the discussion is terminated by one of the participants having changed the rules (from philosophical debate to accepting things by faith).
As for Tom Sawyer, I'd say his moral feelings are clearly superior to his faith.