I live in Scotland, and voted for independence, because for at least a generation Scotland has been more socially progressive and less xenophobic in its culture than England. I think the referendum failed for two reasons. One, now horribly ironic, is that an independent Scotland could not take it for granted that it would be allowed to join the EU. The other one, still very much in force, is economic. At its simplest, what would the currency be? If linked to the UK pound, that would impose major limits on independence. If to the euro, extreme vulnerability, as had been shown in the case of Greece.
Yup, that's pretty much my analysis. Again, though, my point is whether one was pro or against leaving, it was going to be through peaceful, democratic means, given the political-cultural background.
Your analysis of independence movements is flawed by a very short historical timeframe. I am glad to see that, in the case of Taiwan, Percy Chan Chi Wo brought up the matter of "since ancient times." History is measured in centuries, not decades. I cannot speak to the matter of the Basques, but since I am of Scots descent on both my parents' side (my father can trace his lineage back to the 900s from a Norseman converted to Christianity who lived in the Orkneys) I can better speak to that. Your dismissal of the "resistance to violent annexation" just does not apply to the Scots.
Anthony, I'm actually aware of the long history between Scotland and England. It started before the were Scots, when Hadrian chose what is the modern boundary to buil his wall and keep the Pics (the inhabitants of the time) out of the Roman Empire.
But, as I was just saying on another thread, there is a reason I stack to recent examples: the concepts of self-determination of people, democracy, and so on, are recent, and it would be anachronistic to project them back centuries or millennia.
As I told Percy in the case of Taiwan, I don't find historical claims to have much strenght. History is complex, with a lot of reversals, and at any rate I don't see the principle according to which it ought to override the current consensus of people. This means, to me, that Taiwan has a right to independence if its people want it, regardless of how long ago China can trace its claim; and that modern Scots have a right to decide to stay within the UK (as they did during the referendum) regardless of how many of their ancestors thought otherwise.
But a crucial point of the article is that independence movement have very different venues at their disposal depending on the political context. I would support the Taiwanese taking up arms against a Chinese invasion, like I support the Ucranians. But I would not condone Scottish or Basque violence because the settings are democratic countries where they can argue peacifully and fight at the ballot.
Of course, yet other cases may be more muddled and complex. I'm certainly not pretending to have all the solutions!
"What I am committed to, in the end..." only tends to work against the British and French. The Dutch, Russia, China, and other colonists or would be expansionists, are not willing to conceded to anything other than a greater power stopping them.
Given your examples, which side would you have chosen in you back in 1776, The Crown or the colonists.
Munich and Neville Chamberlain deserve a reassessment. Chamberlain went over there, knowing there was little to nothing he could do. So, yes, he agreed to everything Hitler asked for, which infuriated Hitler. Once home, in London, he set about putting 50% of Britain's GDP into the military and would be factories scattered around the nation. He knew he had been hesitant, but once back, he did everything he could to get Britain ready for the war the he clearly foresaw.
That is not appeasement, it is buying time to arm and prepare.
Michael, there's a reason I didn't go back too far in time: until recently, modern concepts of self-determination of people, democracy, etc., simply did not apply. The American revolution is arguably precisely what started that.
My own take is that it was far less about liberty and far more about taxes and economics. Still, since I'm also anti-imperialist, I think I would have supported the rebellio of the colonies. What about you?
I've heard the argument to reassess Munich and Chamberlain. Perhaps it has merits, I'll leave it to historians.
Agreed. It has been a right since the ancient Cynics, who referred to it as parrhesia. It was one of their three basic liberties, the other two being eleutheria (freedom from external constraints and conventional social expectations) and autarkeia (Independence from material desires and external dependencies, self-sufficiency).
Unfortunately, this is not an exact science when historical, cultural, sociopolitical, and economic factors are involved. I do not think anyone can claim appeasement in the past was the right decision, any more than voting to secede is the best choice for the future. Often, secession is not the desire of those seceding, but of the state which they are a part of. And a claim to an existing autonomous state may best be determined by defense, rather than offense.
I think a further complication with the Basque and, for that matter, Catalonia is who gets to vote. In the case of Scotland, was it solely the Scottish? Other residents?
Otherwise I think this is a really good analysis of how to think about these four cases.
Another good point. I think in Scotland anyone who was a citizen and resident could vote, whether he was Scottish or not. That seems right to me: we are talking about a geographical region, not an essence, and the outcome of the vote will affect everyone living in that area, not just Scots.
I never thought about Scotland versus Ukraine. Thanks for pulling together these cases. I agree it would be hard to be a pacifist in the face of Hitler’s actions.
Writing from Hong Kong, I read your framework carefully and want to push on two moves before I develop the argument further in a longer piece.
The first is a silence rather than a claim. You dismiss Russia's Donbas rhetoric explicitly — the "Russophone cultural identity" was real but "cynically weaponized as a pretext for territorial expansion." Fair. But when you turn to Taiwan, the entire rhetorical foundation of the PRC's claim — the "自古以來" or "since ancient times" historical-continuity argument — never enters your framework. You handle the Taiwan case through statehood and annexation-resistance alone, as if the historical-continuity story simply weren't part of the discourse. It is the discourse. Refusing to engage it is a stance, not a neutral omission. Either you think historical-continuity claims deserve no analytical weight (in which case that meta-principle needs its own defense, since it's doing a lot of work), or you find them beneath serious treatment (which is a rhetorical choice, not an argument). Making that choice explicit would strengthen the framework rather than weaken it.
The second is structural. Your three considerations are all — quite reasonably, given the cases at hand — oriented against forced absorption. Democratic self-determination, resistance to violent annexation, consequences of appeasement. Each one triggers against something. But this means the framework has no room to bless a voluntary merger even when the conditions for one look philosophically respectable: mutual consent through legitimate procedures, plausible efficiency gains, meaningful cultural proximity. A hypothetical deepening of EU integration, or a Nordic political union, would sit awkwardly in your framework — not because it should be opposed, but because your considerations only speak when something is being resisted. Merger is not intrinsically illegitimate; annexation is. The morally relevant difference is the consent mechanism plus whether efficiency and cultural conditions genuinely obtain. A framework that cannot articulate the positive case for voluntary union is missing something structural, not just a case.
Two further considerations I couldn't fit into a comment — the labor stock of independent development (why post-independence accumulated stock cannot be morally shared with a non-contributing polity through retroactive historical claim), and the reversibility of secession (why decisions of that magnitude should be treated more like marriage-with-prenup than divorce) — I'm developing in a longer essay. Curious whether you'd read the six-consideration extension as friendly refinement or a challenge to the underlying framework.
Percy, thanks for the detailed comment. I'm going to try to answer your two main points for now.
I agree that historical continuity is indeed part of the picture. That's the basis of the claims in Scotland and Quebec, for instance. The reasons I did not address that directly in the case of Taiwan was simply limited space (I try to keep my essays not too much longer than 2000 words) and, frankly, less detailed acquaintance with the details compared to my grasp of European history. That said, I think historical claims work when they align with the current self-determining preferences of the population, not if they go against them. I don't think China, say, would be justified to invade on the basis of a historical claim if current Taiwanese don't want it.
As to the second point, I disagree, I don't see any issue raised by my framework in the case of mergers, since, again, the main driver is self-determination. I am very much, for instance, in favor of a United States of Europe, a feat that was almost accomplished at the beginning of the 21st century with the referendum for a European constitution. Unfortunately, the referendum failed (barely), but I hope they'll try again.
Thank you for the substantive engagement — and for the concession that historical continuity is indeed part of the picture. That itself sharpens the framework.
On your principle that "historical claims work when they align with the current self-determining preferences of the population" — I agree with the conclusion but want to push on the framing. If historical continuity only carries weight when it aligns with present preference, then it's doing no independent argumentative work — it's just decorative language wrapped around the self-determination axis you already have. That may well be the correct position. But it's a stronger position than the framework currently states, because it explicitly denies historical continuity any standing on its own. Making that explicit would preempt precisely the "自古以來" rhetorical move, rather than leaving it unaddressed.
On mergers, I think your EU example illustrates my point rather than resolving it. The 2005 constitutional referendum failed by a slim margin — but under your framework, would a 51% "yes" outcome have been philosophically sufficient? A voluntary merger of that scale involves not just aggregating current preferences but binding future generations to institutional structures they did not choose. My concern is that self-determination as a purely aggregative present-moment mechanism cannot distinguish a 51% referendum on merger from a 51% referendum on secession, even though the reversibility asymmetries are vastly different. This is what the reversibility consideration (essay forthcoming) is trying to formalize — not as opposition to voluntary union, but as a positive procedural requirement for making one durable.
I'll share the essay when it's ready. Your framework is the natural launching point for it, and I mean that as tribute rather than critique.
Percy, again, good points. Let me try to sharpen my position further.
I guess you are right, I do not see historical claims as overriding current self-determination. They can perhaps strengthen it, or even weaken it if such claims get a hold of the current population, but ultimately it seems to me indefensible to say, well, things were once this way, so that's the way they should be moving forward.
On the European Union and similar situations (like the Scottish or Quebequois ones): rarely the mechanism is a 51% majority. That wasn't the case the for the EU: yes the margin was slim, but it was in terms of member nations, not number of voters. Each nation could establish its own criteria for the referendum to pass / fail. So no, I'm not defending a simple majority criterion, though one would still have to make an argument for why even that criterion should be ignored. Why does a minority get to decide?
Regarding your idea of reversibility, I find it intriguing, but likely impractical. These are momentous decisions, which carry a lot of emotional baggage and logistical difficulties, so I'm having a hard time imagining a "let's give it a try for five years then we'll see" approach.
That said, in a sense that's what the UK did with Brexit: they joined the EU in 1973, then a few decades later decided (mistakenly, I think, but that's a different discussion) that the deal wasn't good anymore and they left. Peacifully. Nobody sent tanks after them...
Massimo — thank you for the exchange here; it prompted me to write out the framework I gestured at in the earlier comment thread. The essay argues for seven items rather than three, adding one meta-level demand and three substantive considerations to your original formulation. I have kept your three procedural considerations intact and cited your essay as the starting point. Would be interested in your response if you have the appetite.
Than\n KS, for this really interesting post, I think the problem we have with these political issues is we often don't really know what's going on in the world. And we often see just one aspect of the problem, like feeling a different part of the elephant. Have a look at this video about Taiwan. It gives a different perspective. With regards Scotland I actually live there but think the philosophical issues are more nuanced. I don't have a problem with the principle of Scottish independance per se it's the actual negative impact on vulnerable groups i am concerned about. Unlike most countries or areas where many want independance such as catalonia or Northern Italy, Scotland is financial completely dependent on funds flowing from London. At the minute it has a population rapidly aging and runs a 12% fiscal deficit. It also carries it share of the enormous UK debt. It would not survive long as an independent country and the imf would take over. The poor would suffer greatly. That is the ethical issue in Scotland.
This is the taiwan video. I am convinced that China would go to war rather than let it go I independent and be a western dagger to its heart. You may not be aware that japan and the usa and india actually see taiwan not as a democratic issue but also as part of what is called the first island defence against China that help contain this emergent power. I see it as a possible world war 1 like flash point that could lead to catastrophique consequences an is probably the greatest threat to world piece. I understand the Chinese position and am very suspect of the usa position whose motivation I am afraid to say is often driven by economic competition for supremacy. The usa particularly fears losing the semiconductor factories.
Tim, all good points. I was in Scotland the year of the referendum, and I have to admit I was glad the independists lost. Not because I did not understand, and in fact sympathyze, with their historical claims, but because I prefer to see more unification throughout Europe, as a counter to the US, Russia, and China. Of course then they went on with Brexit, so...
As for Taiwan, believe me, I'm keenly aware of the untrustworthiness of the United States. Living inside it I have a privileged daily view to American hypochrasy. But what matters most, I think, is the will of the Taiwanese people, and my understanding -- which could be wrong -- is that a majority of them wishes independence.
Massimo i wonder If the secession of a region would impose substantial economic or security costs on the remaining citizens, do they possess moral rights that limit the right of self-determination? I think Ukraine is probably the one that ticks the boxes for me as it is not about the right to cede as Russia agree they were an independent country 30 years ago. They are sovereign. Even the Russian ukrainrian areas agreed. The issue is now that another country abd some unknown numbers in the east of Ukraine want to change this by force.
Tim, first I'd like to premise that, obviously, I don't have the answer to all the possible situations. I'm just trying to think out loud about these issues and see what people say.
Yes, there will always be economic and other consequences. On both sides. The people who voted against Brexit, for instance, are paying the consequences of what was arguably an ill informed decision by the majority. But the referendum itself was largely fair, so they'll abide, and perhaps work toward (democratically) reverse the outcome, eventually.
Same for the "Russian" regions of Ukraine. We don't have a guarantee that we get whatever we want when we live in a democracy. That can only be obtained by force, which of course I think is unacceptable.
I find this topic, fascinating, unfortunately, I have to leave for work and want to reread it to fully ponder my own personal opinion. I fully agree that it’s not a black-and-white issue and there are many factors to consider. However, other similar situations arose when reading this Quebec, for example I would imagine your line of reasoning would be similar to Basque, but wondering what your thoughts are on Tibet.
Your essays and posts are always thought-provoking! Off to work…..
Happy to resume the discussion later, but yes, there are lots of other examples, and the answer, I think, will have to be nuanced, tentative, and taking into consideration the specifics. My inclination is to put Quebec with Scotland and Tibet with Ukraine, for instance. But I could be dissuaded by good arguments.
I live in Scotland, and voted for independence, because for at least a generation Scotland has been more socially progressive and less xenophobic in its culture than England. I think the referendum failed for two reasons. One, now horribly ironic, is that an independent Scotland could not take it for granted that it would be allowed to join the EU. The other one, still very much in force, is economic. At its simplest, what would the currency be? If linked to the UK pound, that would impose major limits on independence. If to the euro, extreme vulnerability, as had been shown in the case of Greece.
Yup, that's pretty much my analysis. Again, though, my point is whether one was pro or against leaving, it was going to be through peaceful, democratic means, given the political-cultural background.
Your analysis of independence movements is flawed by a very short historical timeframe. I am glad to see that, in the case of Taiwan, Percy Chan Chi Wo brought up the matter of "since ancient times." History is measured in centuries, not decades. I cannot speak to the matter of the Basques, but since I am of Scots descent on both my parents' side (my father can trace his lineage back to the 900s from a Norseman converted to Christianity who lived in the Orkneys) I can better speak to that. Your dismissal of the "resistance to violent annexation" just does not apply to the Scots.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Scotland
They were fighting to preserve their independence from England around 1300, at least.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Wallace
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_the_Bruce
This went on for centuries. Bonnie Prince Charlie was one of the leaders of the Jacobin revolution in the mid 1750s
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Edward_Stuart
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacobite_rising_of_1745
I'm sure the Basques have a similar long memory.
As Robby Burns once wrote (500 years after the fact):
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/43813/scots-wha-hae
Scots, wha hae wi' Wallace bled,
Scots, wham Bruce has aften led;
Welcome to your gory bed,
Or to victory!
Now's the day, and now's the hour;
See the front o' battle lour;
See approach proud Edward's power—
Chains and slavery!
Anthony, I'm actually aware of the long history between Scotland and England. It started before the were Scots, when Hadrian chose what is the modern boundary to buil his wall and keep the Pics (the inhabitants of the time) out of the Roman Empire.
But, as I was just saying on another thread, there is a reason I stack to recent examples: the concepts of self-determination of people, democracy, and so on, are recent, and it would be anachronistic to project them back centuries or millennia.
As I told Percy in the case of Taiwan, I don't find historical claims to have much strenght. History is complex, with a lot of reversals, and at any rate I don't see the principle according to which it ought to override the current consensus of people. This means, to me, that Taiwan has a right to independence if its people want it, regardless of how long ago China can trace its claim; and that modern Scots have a right to decide to stay within the UK (as they did during the referendum) regardless of how many of their ancestors thought otherwise.
But a crucial point of the article is that independence movement have very different venues at their disposal depending on the political context. I would support the Taiwanese taking up arms against a Chinese invasion, like I support the Ucranians. But I would not condone Scottish or Basque violence because the settings are democratic countries where they can argue peacifully and fight at the ballot.
Of course, yet other cases may be more muddled and complex. I'm certainly not pretending to have all the solutions!
"What I am committed to, in the end..." only tends to work against the British and French. The Dutch, Russia, China, and other colonists or would be expansionists, are not willing to conceded to anything other than a greater power stopping them.
Given your examples, which side would you have chosen in you back in 1776, The Crown or the colonists.
Munich and Neville Chamberlain deserve a reassessment. Chamberlain went over there, knowing there was little to nothing he could do. So, yes, he agreed to everything Hitler asked for, which infuriated Hitler. Once home, in London, he set about putting 50% of Britain's GDP into the military and would be factories scattered around the nation. He knew he had been hesitant, but once back, he did everything he could to get Britain ready for the war the he clearly foresaw.
That is not appeasement, it is buying time to arm and prepare.
Michael, there's a reason I didn't go back too far in time: until recently, modern concepts of self-determination of people, democracy, etc., simply did not apply. The American revolution is arguably precisely what started that.
My own take is that it was far less about liberty and far more about taxes and economics. Still, since I'm also anti-imperialist, I think I would have supported the rebellio of the colonies. What about you?
I've heard the argument to reassess Munich and Chamberlain. Perhaps it has merits, I'll leave it to historians.
Free speech is one of my basic rights, so anything that would limit that, am likely to be against.
Agreed. It has been a right since the ancient Cynics, who referred to it as parrhesia. It was one of their three basic liberties, the other two being eleutheria (freedom from external constraints and conventional social expectations) and autarkeia (Independence from material desires and external dependencies, self-sufficiency).
Those are Cynics who are amazingly free spirited, compared to modern day ones.
Unfortunately, this is not an exact science when historical, cultural, sociopolitical, and economic factors are involved. I do not think anyone can claim appeasement in the past was the right decision, any more than voting to secede is the best choice for the future. Often, secession is not the desire of those seceding, but of the state which they are a part of. And a claim to an existing autonomous state may best be determined by defense, rather than offense.
I think a further complication with the Basque and, for that matter, Catalonia is who gets to vote. In the case of Scotland, was it solely the Scottish? Other residents?
Otherwise I think this is a really good analysis of how to think about these four cases.
Another good point. I think in Scotland anyone who was a citizen and resident could vote, whether he was Scottish or not. That seems right to me: we are talking about a geographical region, not an essence, and the outcome of the vote will affect everyone living in that area, not just Scots.
I never thought about Scotland versus Ukraine. Thanks for pulling together these cases. I agree it would be hard to be a pacifist in the face of Hitler’s actions.
Writing from Hong Kong, I read your framework carefully and want to push on two moves before I develop the argument further in a longer piece.
The first is a silence rather than a claim. You dismiss Russia's Donbas rhetoric explicitly — the "Russophone cultural identity" was real but "cynically weaponized as a pretext for territorial expansion." Fair. But when you turn to Taiwan, the entire rhetorical foundation of the PRC's claim — the "自古以來" or "since ancient times" historical-continuity argument — never enters your framework. You handle the Taiwan case through statehood and annexation-resistance alone, as if the historical-continuity story simply weren't part of the discourse. It is the discourse. Refusing to engage it is a stance, not a neutral omission. Either you think historical-continuity claims deserve no analytical weight (in which case that meta-principle needs its own defense, since it's doing a lot of work), or you find them beneath serious treatment (which is a rhetorical choice, not an argument). Making that choice explicit would strengthen the framework rather than weaken it.
The second is structural. Your three considerations are all — quite reasonably, given the cases at hand — oriented against forced absorption. Democratic self-determination, resistance to violent annexation, consequences of appeasement. Each one triggers against something. But this means the framework has no room to bless a voluntary merger even when the conditions for one look philosophically respectable: mutual consent through legitimate procedures, plausible efficiency gains, meaningful cultural proximity. A hypothetical deepening of EU integration, or a Nordic political union, would sit awkwardly in your framework — not because it should be opposed, but because your considerations only speak when something is being resisted. Merger is not intrinsically illegitimate; annexation is. The morally relevant difference is the consent mechanism plus whether efficiency and cultural conditions genuinely obtain. A framework that cannot articulate the positive case for voluntary union is missing something structural, not just a case.
Two further considerations I couldn't fit into a comment — the labor stock of independent development (why post-independence accumulated stock cannot be morally shared with a non-contributing polity through retroactive historical claim), and the reversibility of secession (why decisions of that magnitude should be treated more like marriage-with-prenup than divorce) — I'm developing in a longer essay. Curious whether you'd read the six-consideration extension as friendly refinement or a challenge to the underlying framework.
Percy, thanks for the detailed comment. I'm going to try to answer your two main points for now.
I agree that historical continuity is indeed part of the picture. That's the basis of the claims in Scotland and Quebec, for instance. The reasons I did not address that directly in the case of Taiwan was simply limited space (I try to keep my essays not too much longer than 2000 words) and, frankly, less detailed acquaintance with the details compared to my grasp of European history. That said, I think historical claims work when they align with the current self-determining preferences of the population, not if they go against them. I don't think China, say, would be justified to invade on the basis of a historical claim if current Taiwanese don't want it.
As to the second point, I disagree, I don't see any issue raised by my framework in the case of mergers, since, again, the main driver is self-determination. I am very much, for instance, in favor of a United States of Europe, a feat that was almost accomplished at the beginning of the 21st century with the referendum for a European constitution. Unfortunately, the referendum failed (barely), but I hope they'll try again.
Thank you for the substantive engagement — and for the concession that historical continuity is indeed part of the picture. That itself sharpens the framework.
On your principle that "historical claims work when they align with the current self-determining preferences of the population" — I agree with the conclusion but want to push on the framing. If historical continuity only carries weight when it aligns with present preference, then it's doing no independent argumentative work — it's just decorative language wrapped around the self-determination axis you already have. That may well be the correct position. But it's a stronger position than the framework currently states, because it explicitly denies historical continuity any standing on its own. Making that explicit would preempt precisely the "自古以來" rhetorical move, rather than leaving it unaddressed.
On mergers, I think your EU example illustrates my point rather than resolving it. The 2005 constitutional referendum failed by a slim margin — but under your framework, would a 51% "yes" outcome have been philosophically sufficient? A voluntary merger of that scale involves not just aggregating current preferences but binding future generations to institutional structures they did not choose. My concern is that self-determination as a purely aggregative present-moment mechanism cannot distinguish a 51% referendum on merger from a 51% referendum on secession, even though the reversibility asymmetries are vastly different. This is what the reversibility consideration (essay forthcoming) is trying to formalize — not as opposition to voluntary union, but as a positive procedural requirement for making one durable.
I'll share the essay when it's ready. Your framework is the natural launching point for it, and I mean that as tribute rather than critique.
Percy, again, good points. Let me try to sharpen my position further.
I guess you are right, I do not see historical claims as overriding current self-determination. They can perhaps strengthen it, or even weaken it if such claims get a hold of the current population, but ultimately it seems to me indefensible to say, well, things were once this way, so that's the way they should be moving forward.
On the European Union and similar situations (like the Scottish or Quebequois ones): rarely the mechanism is a 51% majority. That wasn't the case the for the EU: yes the margin was slim, but it was in terms of member nations, not number of voters. Each nation could establish its own criteria for the referendum to pass / fail. So no, I'm not defending a simple majority criterion, though one would still have to make an argument for why even that criterion should be ignored. Why does a minority get to decide?
Regarding your idea of reversibility, I find it intriguing, but likely impractical. These are momentous decisions, which carry a lot of emotional baggage and logistical difficulties, so I'm having a hard time imagining a "let's give it a try for five years then we'll see" approach.
That said, in a sense that's what the UK did with Brexit: they joined the EU in 1973, then a few decades later decided (mistakenly, I think, but that's a different discussion) that the deal wasn't good anymore and they left. Peacifully. Nobody sent tanks after them...
Massimo — thank you for the exchange here; it prompted me to write out the framework I gestured at in the earlier comment thread. The essay argues for seven items rather than three, adding one meta-level demand and three substantive considerations to your original formulation. I have kept your three procedural considerations intact and cited your essay as the starting point. Would be interested in your response if you have the appetite.
https://percywhispers.substack.com/p/seven-considerations-for-self-determination?r=5c4z73&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true
Percy, thank you, I'll take a look. Glad that my essay spurred further thought and more discussion. These are crucial issues.
Than\n KS, for this really interesting post, I think the problem we have with these political issues is we often don't really know what's going on in the world. And we often see just one aspect of the problem, like feeling a different part of the elephant. Have a look at this video about Taiwan. It gives a different perspective. With regards Scotland I actually live there but think the philosophical issues are more nuanced. I don't have a problem with the principle of Scottish independance per se it's the actual negative impact on vulnerable groups i am concerned about. Unlike most countries or areas where many want independance such as catalonia or Northern Italy, Scotland is financial completely dependent on funds flowing from London. At the minute it has a population rapidly aging and runs a 12% fiscal deficit. It also carries it share of the enormous UK debt. It would not survive long as an independent country and the imf would take over. The poor would suffer greatly. That is the ethical issue in Scotland.
This is the taiwan video. I am convinced that China would go to war rather than let it go I independent and be a western dagger to its heart. You may not be aware that japan and the usa and india actually see taiwan not as a democratic issue but also as part of what is called the first island defence against China that help contain this emergent power. I see it as a possible world war 1 like flash point that could lead to catastrophique consequences an is probably the greatest threat to world piece. I understand the Chinese position and am very suspect of the usa position whose motivation I am afraid to say is often driven by economic competition for supremacy. The usa particularly fears losing the semiconductor factories.
In summary I hope fir the best but fear the worse
https://youtu.be/ExzoQSArzxI?is=8zOYbt2HokksXh_T
Tim, all good points. I was in Scotland the year of the referendum, and I have to admit I was glad the independists lost. Not because I did not understand, and in fact sympathyze, with their historical claims, but because I prefer to see more unification throughout Europe, as a counter to the US, Russia, and China. Of course then they went on with Brexit, so...
As for Taiwan, believe me, I'm keenly aware of the untrustworthiness of the United States. Living inside it I have a privileged daily view to American hypochrasy. But what matters most, I think, is the will of the Taiwanese people, and my understanding -- which could be wrong -- is that a majority of them wishes independence.
Massimo i wonder If the secession of a region would impose substantial economic or security costs on the remaining citizens, do they possess moral rights that limit the right of self-determination? I think Ukraine is probably the one that ticks the boxes for me as it is not about the right to cede as Russia agree they were an independent country 30 years ago. They are sovereign. Even the Russian ukrainrian areas agreed. The issue is now that another country abd some unknown numbers in the east of Ukraine want to change this by force.
Tim, first I'd like to premise that, obviously, I don't have the answer to all the possible situations. I'm just trying to think out loud about these issues and see what people say.
Yes, there will always be economic and other consequences. On both sides. The people who voted against Brexit, for instance, are paying the consequences of what was arguably an ill informed decision by the majority. But the referendum itself was largely fair, so they'll abide, and perhaps work toward (democratically) reverse the outcome, eventually.
Same for the "Russian" regions of Ukraine. We don't have a guarantee that we get whatever we want when we live in a democracy. That can only be obtained by force, which of course I think is unacceptable.
I find this topic, fascinating, unfortunately, I have to leave for work and want to reread it to fully ponder my own personal opinion. I fully agree that it’s not a black-and-white issue and there are many factors to consider. However, other similar situations arose when reading this Quebec, for example I would imagine your line of reasoning would be similar to Basque, but wondering what your thoughts are on Tibet.
Your essays and posts are always thought-provoking! Off to work…..
Happy to resume the discussion later, but yes, there are lots of other examples, and the answer, I think, will have to be nuanced, tentative, and taking into consideration the specifics. My inclination is to put Quebec with Scotland and Tibet with Ukraine, for instance. But I could be dissuaded by good arguments.