Tangentially, check out the book "Did the Science Wars Take Place" by William Gillis, with a forward by Matilde Marcolli. It's an interesting examination of the science wars of the 90s and a look at the anti-realism and anti-science stance of the new right. It's an anarchist's polemic for realism, of all things. A mirror world to Krauss' "War on Science"
You nailed it! Excellent work! I chased the Free Will merry go round for quite a while. Now I tend to agree with you. But here’s the thing: we have a duty to act as if we do have free will.
David, glad to hear it! I don't think we have that duty, we just have the duty to use our judgment-making cognitive machinery (Epictetus's prohairesis) to the best, and constantly striving to improve it. That's good enough, I think.
The something vs. nothing argument lies in astrophysics as you say but how would we detect this nothingness? Our entire basis for thought rests on basic concepts of light and gravity. Nothingness would be without either.
Our concept of reality would have to be redefined to include this nothingness and its parameters, if any.
Thought-provoking and fun as always, but I am compelled to offer a bit of sed contra. (1) Some distinctions and methodological throat-clearing: (a) Metaphysical issues may depend on facts, be expressed in language, and be debated in logic; but I think you take upon yourself the burden of proving that all metaphysical issues are entirely reducible to observable facts expressed in language. You face that squarely in some spots, but in other places your piece is a bit fuzzy on that distinction. (b) Surely that a particular issue has been long debated, generates a lot of literature, and has not reached a consensus does not necessitate that the discipline’s object of inquiry is illusory; it might equally well mean that the discipline is thriving but deals with a difficult subject-matter. (c) Perhaps some ostensibly metaphysical questions have legitimate (extant, real) subject-matter, but are trivial or uninteresting; e.g., whether there is a way of conclusively establishing the “identity” of the Ship of Theseus. Or, perhaps it’s a legitimate metaphysical conclusion to determine that a concept such as “identity” is disjunctive or context-dependent in some way — but such disjunction or context dependence is not the same as reduction to observable facts and arbitrary language conventions.
(2) Some counter-examples to your thesis: (a) What’s prohairesis in Stoic philosophy? Is it reducible to atoms, molecules, and words? Perhaps you would defend that position, but it seems inconsistent with the tenor of much Stoic philosophy, as I understand it; you’ve inspired me to read the Discourses and the Meditations, and I don’t think Marcus or Epictetus would agree. It’s certainly legitimate for you to update their arguments, but that seems like a big gap to fill. (b) Why do you write, teach, and speak? Are you just rearranging air, ink, and digital bytes to participate in a physical chain of causation affecting other brains? Certainly that physical chain of events occurs; but is the entirety of your Stoic teaching and philosophy reducible to it? (c) What are justice and the good? Are they also reducible to atoms and arbitrarily chosen language? (And I do think your position requires that you defend that the language choices are “arbitrary”; if there’s capital-“T” Truth or capital-“R” Reason that requires certain language choices, I think Hume’s position fails.)
(3) Hume’s position is question-begging or self-refuting: to argue that there is nothing more than empirical observable facts and language (or ideas) is an ontological claim that has to be defended. Mind you, I do not deny that there may be important and essential dependence on empirical facts in order for metaphysically relevant entities to exist and operate, but they are not, in my opinion, reducible to observable facts and words.
(4) It’s a bit of a cheat for you to take logic and language as a given; they’re full of mysterious ontological questions about how words can refer to things, how meaning can be conveyed, etc. I find it similarly evasive to characterize metaphysics as conceptual analysis; it’s either just philology (if you’re prepared to defend that), or it’s tracing conceptual relationships that align (or not) with realities that are not fully captured by measurements and sensory observations.
(5) There are, I believe, very significant questions as to whether mind can be reduced to biology, biology can be reduced to chemistry, and even whether chemistry can be reduced to physics. The Aristotelian parlance of “form” might not be invoked to attempt to address those subjects, but it’s an unavoidably metaphysical debate. I think metaphysics can fruitfully contribute to a deeper understanding of the relationship between different academic disciplines — and not just a demoted metaphysics acting as a sort of helpful assistant, but rather by framing the relationships in terms of the traditional principles and ideas of metaphysics.
(6) I sometimes think that metaphysics gets a bad rap because of a sort of intellectual hangover — Aristotelians and Scholastics emphasize metaphysics and are accused of impeding scientific progress. That’s another debate, but even if the accusations are granted, that just means the metaphysical analysis was conducted improperly, not that the questions themselves are improper and just a mask for empirical observation and word games.
Even though I disagree, as always I’m grateful for your insight and wit. P.S. Think you’re a “trekkie,” not a “treekie.”
Christopher, thanks for the thoughtful commentary, let's see if I can address some of your points:
> Some distinctions and methodological throat-clearing: (a) Metaphysical issues may depend on facts, be expressed in language, and be debated in logic; but I think you take upon yourself the burden of proving that all metaphysical issues are entirely reducible to observable facts expressed in language. You face that squarely in some spots, but in other places your piece is a bit fuzzy on that distinction. <
Not just empirical facts and language, logic as well. I don't see what else is left. When metaphysicians debate their theories it seems to me that's all the tools they use. What do you think is missing? As for being a bit fuzzy in some of my examples, please name them and I'll endeavour to reduce the fuzziness.
> Surely that a particular issue has been long debated, generates a lot of literature, and has not reached a consensus does not necessitate that the discipline’s object of inquiry is illusory; it might equally well mean that the discipline is thriving but deals with a difficult subject-matter. <
Hard to imagine a discipline that is thriving and yet not making any progress.
> What’s prohairesis in Stoic philosophy? Is it reducible to atoms, molecules, and words? <
Absolutely they would. The Stoics thought that everything is made of matter and eventually decays and dies. What else is the prohairesis "made of" if not atoms, molecules, and so forth? I identity the prohairesis with what modern cognitive scientists call the executive function of the brain, located in the frontal lobes.
> Why do you write, teach, and speak? Are you just rearranging air, ink, and digital bytes to participate in a physical chain of causation affecting other brains? <
Yes.
> What are justice and the good? Are they also reducible to atoms and arbitrarily chosen language? <
They are human concepts, which means they are thoughts coming out of brains made of matter. They are grounded in facts about human nature and what makes human beings flourish, since the Stoics thought that ethics itself is an empirical discipline.
> Hume’s position is question-begging or self-refuting: to argue that there is nothing more than empirical observable facts and language (or ideas) is an ontological claim that has to be defended. <
You keep forgetting logic. I see nothing self-refuting in such a claim. Hume, and I, are simply making a pragmatic argument: we think that unless something is based on facts or relations of ideas it doesn't contribute to our knowledge of the world. The same epistemology that Einstein articulated (see here: https://figsinwintertime.substack.com/p/if-you-aint-got-evidence-you-dont). If anyone disagrees I'd be happy to entertain counterexamples. So far I got none.
> It’s a bit of a cheat for you to take logic and language as a given; they’re full of mysterious ontological questions about how words can refer to things, how meaning can be conveyed, etc. <
I don't take anything for a given. But I also don't see anything mysterious in how words refer to things. More importantly, I've never claimed that science, logic, and semantics have answers to all possible questions. I've simply claimed that metaphysics doesn't.
> There are, I believe, very significant questions as to whether mind can be reduced to biology, biology can be reduced to chemistry, and even whether chemistry can be reduced to physics. <
If the mind is not biology, chemistry, and physics, what is it? And, more to the point, how do we know? The answer to the latter question, I think, will again be: science, logic, and semantics. Nothing that metaphysics contributes to this or any other question outside of those three components.
> I think metaphysics can fruitfully contribute to a deeper understanding of the relationship between different academic disciplines <
Yes, when done properly, as advocated by people like Ladyman and Ross. And to do metaphysics properly, again, means to engage with science, logic, and semantics. Nothing else.
> that just means the metaphysical analysis was conducted improperly, not that the questions themselves are improper and just a mask for empirical observation and word games <
Right, scholastic and analytic metaphysics are indeed done improperly. That's the whole point of my post.
No lies told. Sometimes our understanding builds slowly and imperceptibly. Sometimes it appears like a lightening bolt. About a decade ago, I was reading a book on cosmology on the heels of a book on natural selection. And then it hit me - this is metaphysics, whether you want to call it its replacement, its substitute, or its evolution (heh). If you really want to poke the bear, you could do a search-and-replace, and insert religion for metaphysics throughout this essay, and really watch your comment section bubble…
Consigning all metaphysical questions to the flames has taught me to scrutinize the foundations of all sorts of questions that are without foundation. It has also relieved me of the stress of pondering questions that are nonsensical, while encouraging me to focus my attention on questions that are worthwhile. The endeavor has not only been properly scientific but ethical.
I just read that it was suggested by the production crew of the Wrath of Khan. Saavik and Kirk have a conversation as they beam back up from the Regula Space station. 😊
Fun fact (speaking of the Star Trek transporter and the ship of Theseus) in a recent Star Trek comic book series, the hero ship is the USS Theseus - the oldest ship in Starfleet, with various components and systems gradually replaced over decades. The story takes place a couple of years after the end of DS9 and the chief engineer is Scotty, whom at this point should be over 200 years old, but is "preserved" in the transporter for for 60 or 70 years (see TNG episode Relics). Is the USS Theseus in fact the oldest ship in Star Fleet? Is that actually Scotty who was preserved in the transport for decades or a copy? I'm a bit of a Trekkie, if you couldn't tell.
Good read! I do think you’re right that many questions we think of as “metaphysics” are actually logic, semantics, or science. This reminds me of how some people question whether “metaphysical possibility” is really a thing in the P-Zombie thought experiment.
That said, let me defend the good discipline of metaphysics a little! Even if you think such arguments are false, it’s not clear to me that certain dualist arguments like the Argument from Intentionality or certain theistic arguments like the Kalam Cosmological Argument or the contingency arguments can be completely reduced to logic, science, or semantics.
It seems that even to critique these arguments you need to use some metaphysical reasoning. That said, it may be difficult to conclude anything and come down to competing intuitions.
So you could adhere to some sort of metaphysical skepticism, but I actually think that’s different from outright saying metaphysical questions or inquiry doesn’t exist.
Well if we look at something like the Kalam Cosmological Argument:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, it has a cause.
It seems to me that at least (1) is a metaphysical claim. It’s not purely logic and I don’t think whether something comes into being uncaused or not is purely semantics. It could be scientific—we could try to empirically investigate this, but it is more general than that and goes beyond simply the laws of the particular universe.
Or in the Contingency Argument, whether the Principle of Sufficient Reason is true seems to involve metaphysical reasoning as opposed to purely logical reasoning.
And to be clear, I’m not saying either of these are sound arguments, nor that we can necessarily even come to conclusions regarding them, just that there does seem to be a different type of reasoning than pure science, logic, or semantics.
I’ll also further note I think you can have metaphysical reasoning based on experience. It does not have to be a priori. Would that be considered “science”? I concede it could depend on what we mean by “science”. For instance if I support P1 of the KCA by saying we do not see things popping into being out of nothing, does that count as “science”?
Matthew, at the end of your comment you answered your own question: yes, if the defense of a statement is empirical then it falls into "science" broadly construed.
Take your reconstruction of the Kalam argument: premise one is empirical. How do we know that everything that begins to exist has a cause? Because we've never seen anything come out of nothing. In fact, that premise is directly contradicted by quantum mechanics, which shows precisely that, at the quantum level, particles do come out of nothing. Or appear to do so until we know better.
The exact same point applies to the principle of sufficient reason, which underlies the Kalam argument.
By the way, these are "arguments," which means they are grounded in logic. And they depend, of course, on the precise definitions of key terms, that is, on semantics. Once these three ingredients (empirical evidence, logic, and semantics) have been considered, I don't see what is left that is specifically "metaphysical."
Matthew, let me ask you: what, exactly, do you think is outside of semantics, science, or logic, in those arguments? That is, what is specifically "metaphysical"?
I question the idea of identity. It is my contention that consciousness is an aspect of our universe, given that, an identity is merely something that separates one from everything that is to some given degree, and thus more of an impediment than a means of progress.
If Aristotle died in 322 B.C., then within a hundred years of that would be the third century B.C., not the first, which would be the last hundred years of the B.C. ear.
Michael, consciousness is an aspect of our universe in the sense that we are conscious and part of the universe. Nothing else, as far as I can tell.
As for identity, you don't think that you and I are distinct organisms and thinking persons? Then how come we disagree on things, or find ourselves in different locations in the universe?
The hands of a watch and the winding stem are different parts of a watch, but they work in unison, part of a single entity. In my view, based on the Big Bang or pre-Big Bang theory, this Universe emerged as a unity, which quickly began to differentiate. Everything and everyone is made of this original source and it has retained itself as one universe. That we may disagree is allowed, what matters is where we find agreement on our road to wisdom.
The stuff we are made of is energy, that has condensed into forms. The forms and their perceptions are different by nature, the energy remains basically the same.
Again, no qualms about energy and matter. But the claim about identity simply does not follow. Being made of the same stuff (matter / energy) that behaves in the same way (according to the laws of nature) does not at all imply that you and I are identical.
Massimo, I don't see metaphysics as efforts at epistemiological rigor as much as interpretations of the (scientific) facts. I realize some metaphysicians may claim otherwise, but that's why they can be so liable to the criticisms you list here. Seen only as interpretations of the facts, I don't perceive anything wrong with their endeavors. Their insights can resonate with people, offering them a grounding and meaning in reality that scientific facts alone fail to do. In fact, with the gradual demise of religions, they seem to be just what the doctor ordered in a world where a sense of the transcendent is being undermined by the crass materialism and consumerism that are the mark of our societies.
You make ask, does this make metaphysics only useful and practical, rather than true? Maybe! But then again, maybe not! As we have learned more about the world, from shamanic times until today, our interpretations have evolved, too. As science has come come closer to truth, maybe the interpretations of science are doing the same. Bottom line: I don't understand why you feel the need to be so critical of these people. If anything, they may be filling a void that science on its own fails to do.
Jim, well, I feel the need to be critical of anyone who makes claims they cannot deliver, because that's intellectually either vacuous or dishonest.
But in this case seems to me that we agree: what you present as metaphysics-as-interpretation-of science is what is called scientific metaphysics by people like James Ladyman and Don Ross. And that's exactly what I endorse.
I'm not familiar with them, but I strongly suspect they don't do the kind of interpreting I had in mind! 😀
Here's a premise I offer based on what I've read and studied over the years. I've seen psychologists make the same claim. Humans need a story. A narrative that provides direction, purpose, and meaning. Religions fulfilled this need for centuries. Now their influence is waning (in no small part due to science) and people are increasingly feeling a void that needs to be filled. What I'm suggesting is a new, science-based story that can fulfill this function, and this is what I see many cosmologists and various thinkers doing. It's sometimes called the Universe Story, or Epic of Evolution. This "story" (or stories, since interpretations can vary) draws on the cosmological, biological, and cultural evolution of the universe and encourages people to see their lives from this cosmic perspective. Now if scientists feel the need to strike this down because interpretations seem unwarranted, or because they see category mistakes or logical inconsistencies or anthrpomorphism, it totally misses the point. This endeavor isn't meant to deliver metaphysical proofs or to pass every scientific requirement. It's meant to provide coherence, meaning, and a heartfelt sense of belonging in an otherwise seemingly meaningless and hostile universe. And who's to say? It could be true to boot! 😀
Jim, you seem to be describing what a science popularizer like Carl Sagan or Richard Dawkins might do. No qualms there. My target are professional metaphysicians who pretend to discover new things about the world that are somehow distinct from what science, logic, and language do.
No. I'm aware that Sagan and Dawkins try to invoke the majesty and wonder of science, but in the end they leave me a bit cold. I mean people like Brian Swimme or integral theory philosophers - or even cosmologists or some theologians for that matter. In fact I try to integrate Stoicism with some of these insights - viewing the prookopton as a call in cosmic evolution. As usual though, the theory is a lot easier than the practice! 😆
Jim, yeah those are clearly not my cups of tea. A bit too woo for my taste. And I don't actually think people need that sort of crutch to deal with existential problems.
That said, the current post has a different target, it's about so-called analytic metaphysics, which is the dominant approach to metaphysics in professional philosophy.
Sure, maybe crutch for some, but a necessary and meaningful life narrative for others. Recall my premise, the human need for a story. A story that could lie on a spectrum from the poetic and metaphorical to the purposeful and real, whatever the inclination of the particular person.
Yes, I realize my musings are a bit off topic from the post at hand, but given your misgivings about (analytic) metaphysics in general, I thought it useful to suggest another angle to the subject.
Agreed with all that Massimo, except that I prefer Dennet's take on free will to Sapolski's and Unger & Smolin's on time. Both seem equally empirically and scientifically based but somehow have a greater intuitive appeal; not that that is necessarily a guide to anything.
One of the oldest argument is that we keep returning to the same issue if in practise as a culture or articles on substack. It never seams to go away. Do we still believe that everything we do not understand is magic as we do in demons. Or are there just somethings that Science can most likely never answer. Is not the most logical and rational answer is one falls in the area of metaphysics?
I would suggest your argument overreaches the support given. That there are no metaphysical questions and that everything reduces to science, logic, or semantics. But detailed examples used are the identity puzzles of Theseus’ Ship and the Star Trek transporter. These are already the easiest cases to treat as matters of definition and they are not representative all.
Much of metaphysics concerns grounding, modality, laws of nature, ontological dependence, universals, particulars, and the structure of necessity. These are not reducible to empirical science because physics presupposes them. Physics might say what the laws are but the question of what it means for something to count as a law is not a scientific finding and not a semantic choice.
The question of free will is not sorted by neuroscience as it is not just about physical mechanism but about the relation between agency, causation, and responsibility. The mind body issue is not resolved by pointing out that the universe contains matter and energy since this leaves the problem of mental properties unexamined.
By saying “there are no metaphysical questions” functions as a metaphysical thesis about the structure and limits of inquiry. It is not placable in science or semantics without circularity.
Some philosophical puzzles arise from language I can agree with and in certain cases clarification dissolves confusion. But identity puzzles do not define the everything and the saying that all metaphysics collapses into other fields requires argument rather than assertion.
Edgar, to begin with, I have a large number of examples, not limited to issues of identity. Second, as usual, my point is epistemological: there certainly are limits to science and reason, but what *else* has provided us with anything tangible? The questions you list have been discussed by metaphysicians for millennia, and no progress has been made. According to philosopher of science Imre Lakatos this would qualify metaphysics as a "degenrate" research program, similar to pseudoscience.
Let's take just one of those examples: the laws of nature. We have learned far more about them from physics than from anything that any metaphysicians has ever written. And if there are questions about them that we can't answer, so be it. Inventing answers that rest on nothing isn't helpful.
Even if we agree with Lakatos only shows that some questions progress slowly not that they are illegitimate. Unresolved empirical problems are endless... dark matter, consciousness, the measurement problem, the origin of life, or Alzheimers mechanisms.
We do not dismiss these as “degenerate” or unhelpful.
Unresolved does not mean invented and analysing concepts is not the same as fabricating answers.
Nor is it fabrication to accept the most logical and coherent provisional answer when necessary, so long as it is not contrary to what we do know. Temporary models are a normal part of inquiry until better evidence arrives. As does not science do the exact same thing?
No, science most definitely does not do the same thing. Again, we either make progress or we accept that we don't currently have viable answers. Metaphysics does neither, it pretends to have answers. Metaphysicians do not "accept the most logical and coherent provosional answer," they keep bickering for millennia about their favorite pet theory. Not the same thing.
Can I ask how you incorporate modality into your anti-metaphysical ideas. Maybe also how you understand truths that are both necessary and a posteriori? I get this may be a bigger conversation so maybe best saved for another day. If so thanks for the discussion.
Not difficult at all: modality is the joint providence of language and logic, and when it pertains real world situations it has to be empirically informed.
"Truth" pertains to epistemology, and on that I'm with Quine: epistemology is an empirical discipline. The only "necessary" truths are found in math and logic, which means they are the result of tautologies. There is no such thing as a necessary truth in the physical world.
Love this article.
Tangentially, check out the book "Did the Science Wars Take Place" by William Gillis, with a forward by Matilde Marcolli. It's an interesting examination of the science wars of the 90s and a look at the anti-realism and anti-science stance of the new right. It's an anarchist's polemic for realism, of all things. A mirror world to Krauss' "War on Science"
Thanks for the suggestion!
Funtoreao. Enjoyable comments
You nailed it! Excellent work! I chased the Free Will merry go round for quite a while. Now I tend to agree with you. But here’s the thing: we have a duty to act as if we do have free will.
David, glad to hear it! I don't think we have that duty, we just have the duty to use our judgment-making cognitive machinery (Epictetus's prohairesis) to the best, and constantly striving to improve it. That's good enough, I think.
Ahh,
Thank you for this.
No true Scotsman would be dintegrating Kirk all over space if he thought he was killing him.
True. But even Scotsmen make mistakes...
The something vs. nothing argument lies in astrophysics as you say but how would we detect this nothingness? Our entire basis for thought rests on basic concepts of light and gravity. Nothingness would be without either.
Our concept of reality would have to be redefined to include this nothingness and its parameters, if any.
Just thoughts in general.
Thomas, I agree, I don't think that's a question we'll ever be able to resolve. But alleged "metaphysical" answers ain't gonna do it either.
Thought-provoking and fun as always, but I am compelled to offer a bit of sed contra. (1) Some distinctions and methodological throat-clearing: (a) Metaphysical issues may depend on facts, be expressed in language, and be debated in logic; but I think you take upon yourself the burden of proving that all metaphysical issues are entirely reducible to observable facts expressed in language. You face that squarely in some spots, but in other places your piece is a bit fuzzy on that distinction. (b) Surely that a particular issue has been long debated, generates a lot of literature, and has not reached a consensus does not necessitate that the discipline’s object of inquiry is illusory; it might equally well mean that the discipline is thriving but deals with a difficult subject-matter. (c) Perhaps some ostensibly metaphysical questions have legitimate (extant, real) subject-matter, but are trivial or uninteresting; e.g., whether there is a way of conclusively establishing the “identity” of the Ship of Theseus. Or, perhaps it’s a legitimate metaphysical conclusion to determine that a concept such as “identity” is disjunctive or context-dependent in some way — but such disjunction or context dependence is not the same as reduction to observable facts and arbitrary language conventions.
(2) Some counter-examples to your thesis: (a) What’s prohairesis in Stoic philosophy? Is it reducible to atoms, molecules, and words? Perhaps you would defend that position, but it seems inconsistent with the tenor of much Stoic philosophy, as I understand it; you’ve inspired me to read the Discourses and the Meditations, and I don’t think Marcus or Epictetus would agree. It’s certainly legitimate for you to update their arguments, but that seems like a big gap to fill. (b) Why do you write, teach, and speak? Are you just rearranging air, ink, and digital bytes to participate in a physical chain of causation affecting other brains? Certainly that physical chain of events occurs; but is the entirety of your Stoic teaching and philosophy reducible to it? (c) What are justice and the good? Are they also reducible to atoms and arbitrarily chosen language? (And I do think your position requires that you defend that the language choices are “arbitrary”; if there’s capital-“T” Truth or capital-“R” Reason that requires certain language choices, I think Hume’s position fails.)
(3) Hume’s position is question-begging or self-refuting: to argue that there is nothing more than empirical observable facts and language (or ideas) is an ontological claim that has to be defended. Mind you, I do not deny that there may be important and essential dependence on empirical facts in order for metaphysically relevant entities to exist and operate, but they are not, in my opinion, reducible to observable facts and words.
(4) It’s a bit of a cheat for you to take logic and language as a given; they’re full of mysterious ontological questions about how words can refer to things, how meaning can be conveyed, etc. I find it similarly evasive to characterize metaphysics as conceptual analysis; it’s either just philology (if you’re prepared to defend that), or it’s tracing conceptual relationships that align (or not) with realities that are not fully captured by measurements and sensory observations.
(5) There are, I believe, very significant questions as to whether mind can be reduced to biology, biology can be reduced to chemistry, and even whether chemistry can be reduced to physics. The Aristotelian parlance of “form” might not be invoked to attempt to address those subjects, but it’s an unavoidably metaphysical debate. I think metaphysics can fruitfully contribute to a deeper understanding of the relationship between different academic disciplines — and not just a demoted metaphysics acting as a sort of helpful assistant, but rather by framing the relationships in terms of the traditional principles and ideas of metaphysics.
(6) I sometimes think that metaphysics gets a bad rap because of a sort of intellectual hangover — Aristotelians and Scholastics emphasize metaphysics and are accused of impeding scientific progress. That’s another debate, but even if the accusations are granted, that just means the metaphysical analysis was conducted improperly, not that the questions themselves are improper and just a mask for empirical observation and word games.
Even though I disagree, as always I’m grateful for your insight and wit. P.S. Think you’re a “trekkie,” not a “treekie.”
Christopher, thanks for the thoughtful commentary, let's see if I can address some of your points:
> Some distinctions and methodological throat-clearing: (a) Metaphysical issues may depend on facts, be expressed in language, and be debated in logic; but I think you take upon yourself the burden of proving that all metaphysical issues are entirely reducible to observable facts expressed in language. You face that squarely in some spots, but in other places your piece is a bit fuzzy on that distinction. <
Not just empirical facts and language, logic as well. I don't see what else is left. When metaphysicians debate their theories it seems to me that's all the tools they use. What do you think is missing? As for being a bit fuzzy in some of my examples, please name them and I'll endeavour to reduce the fuzziness.
> Surely that a particular issue has been long debated, generates a lot of literature, and has not reached a consensus does not necessitate that the discipline’s object of inquiry is illusory; it might equally well mean that the discipline is thriving but deals with a difficult subject-matter. <
Hard to imagine a discipline that is thriving and yet not making any progress.
> What’s prohairesis in Stoic philosophy? Is it reducible to atoms, molecules, and words? <
Absolutely they would. The Stoics thought that everything is made of matter and eventually decays and dies. What else is the prohairesis "made of" if not atoms, molecules, and so forth? I identity the prohairesis with what modern cognitive scientists call the executive function of the brain, located in the frontal lobes.
> Why do you write, teach, and speak? Are you just rearranging air, ink, and digital bytes to participate in a physical chain of causation affecting other brains? <
Yes.
> What are justice and the good? Are they also reducible to atoms and arbitrarily chosen language? <
They are human concepts, which means they are thoughts coming out of brains made of matter. They are grounded in facts about human nature and what makes human beings flourish, since the Stoics thought that ethics itself is an empirical discipline.
> Hume’s position is question-begging or self-refuting: to argue that there is nothing more than empirical observable facts and language (or ideas) is an ontological claim that has to be defended. <
You keep forgetting logic. I see nothing self-refuting in such a claim. Hume, and I, are simply making a pragmatic argument: we think that unless something is based on facts or relations of ideas it doesn't contribute to our knowledge of the world. The same epistemology that Einstein articulated (see here: https://figsinwintertime.substack.com/p/if-you-aint-got-evidence-you-dont). If anyone disagrees I'd be happy to entertain counterexamples. So far I got none.
> It’s a bit of a cheat for you to take logic and language as a given; they’re full of mysterious ontological questions about how words can refer to things, how meaning can be conveyed, etc. <
I don't take anything for a given. But I also don't see anything mysterious in how words refer to things. More importantly, I've never claimed that science, logic, and semantics have answers to all possible questions. I've simply claimed that metaphysics doesn't.
> There are, I believe, very significant questions as to whether mind can be reduced to biology, biology can be reduced to chemistry, and even whether chemistry can be reduced to physics. <
If the mind is not biology, chemistry, and physics, what is it? And, more to the point, how do we know? The answer to the latter question, I think, will again be: science, logic, and semantics. Nothing that metaphysics contributes to this or any other question outside of those three components.
> I think metaphysics can fruitfully contribute to a deeper understanding of the relationship between different academic disciplines <
Yes, when done properly, as advocated by people like Ladyman and Ross. And to do metaphysics properly, again, means to engage with science, logic, and semantics. Nothing else.
> that just means the metaphysical analysis was conducted improperly, not that the questions themselves are improper and just a mask for empirical observation and word games <
Right, scholastic and analytic metaphysics are indeed done improperly. That's the whole point of my post.
No lies told. Sometimes our understanding builds slowly and imperceptibly. Sometimes it appears like a lightening bolt. About a decade ago, I was reading a book on cosmology on the heels of a book on natural selection. And then it hit me - this is metaphysics, whether you want to call it its replacement, its substitute, or its evolution (heh). If you really want to poke the bear, you could do a search-and-replace, and insert religion for metaphysics throughout this essay, and really watch your comment section bubble…
David, yup. Of course I consider religion (at best) a subset of metaphysics, or a particular way of doing metaphysics.
Consigning all metaphysical questions to the flames has taught me to scrutinize the foundations of all sorts of questions that are without foundation. It has also relieved me of the stress of pondering questions that are nonsensical, while encouraging me to focus my attention on questions that are worthwhile. The endeavor has not only been properly scientific but ethical.
Daniel, that's exactly my feeling. You get rid of a lot of nonsense and save a lot of time.
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Captain Kirk died thousands of times? But they have conversations while beaming. When is there time to die?
No they don't, conversations are before of after. You can't converse while your body is reduced to smithereens...
I saw them in the Wrath of Khan talking while beaming. 😄
I just read that it was suggested by the production crew of the Wrath of Khan. Saavik and Kirk have a conversation as they beam back up from the Regula Space station. 😊
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They should be fired, retroactively! 😆
I'm sure that was a mistake in the script!
Fun fact (speaking of the Star Trek transporter and the ship of Theseus) in a recent Star Trek comic book series, the hero ship is the USS Theseus - the oldest ship in Starfleet, with various components and systems gradually replaced over decades. The story takes place a couple of years after the end of DS9 and the chief engineer is Scotty, whom at this point should be over 200 years old, but is "preserved" in the transporter for for 60 or 70 years (see TNG episode Relics). Is the USS Theseus in fact the oldest ship in Star Fleet? Is that actually Scotty who was preserved in the transport for decades or a copy? I'm a bit of a Trekkie, if you couldn't tell.
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Good read! I do think you’re right that many questions we think of as “metaphysics” are actually logic, semantics, or science. This reminds me of how some people question whether “metaphysical possibility” is really a thing in the P-Zombie thought experiment.
That said, let me defend the good discipline of metaphysics a little! Even if you think such arguments are false, it’s not clear to me that certain dualist arguments like the Argument from Intentionality or certain theistic arguments like the Kalam Cosmological Argument or the contingency arguments can be completely reduced to logic, science, or semantics.
It seems that even to critique these arguments you need to use some metaphysical reasoning. That said, it may be difficult to conclude anything and come down to competing intuitions.
So you could adhere to some sort of metaphysical skepticism, but I actually think that’s different from outright saying metaphysical questions or inquiry doesn’t exist.
Well if we look at something like the Kalam Cosmological Argument:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, it has a cause.
It seems to me that at least (1) is a metaphysical claim. It’s not purely logic and I don’t think whether something comes into being uncaused or not is purely semantics. It could be scientific—we could try to empirically investigate this, but it is more general than that and goes beyond simply the laws of the particular universe.
Or in the Contingency Argument, whether the Principle of Sufficient Reason is true seems to involve metaphysical reasoning as opposed to purely logical reasoning.
And to be clear, I’m not saying either of these are sound arguments, nor that we can necessarily even come to conclusions regarding them, just that there does seem to be a different type of reasoning than pure science, logic, or semantics.
I’ll also further note I think you can have metaphysical reasoning based on experience. It does not have to be a priori. Would that be considered “science”? I concede it could depend on what we mean by “science”. For instance if I support P1 of the KCA by saying we do not see things popping into being out of nothing, does that count as “science”?
Matthew, at the end of your comment you answered your own question: yes, if the defense of a statement is empirical then it falls into "science" broadly construed.
Take your reconstruction of the Kalam argument: premise one is empirical. How do we know that everything that begins to exist has a cause? Because we've never seen anything come out of nothing. In fact, that premise is directly contradicted by quantum mechanics, which shows precisely that, at the quantum level, particles do come out of nothing. Or appear to do so until we know better.
The exact same point applies to the principle of sufficient reason, which underlies the Kalam argument.
By the way, these are "arguments," which means they are grounded in logic. And they depend, of course, on the precise definitions of key terms, that is, on semantics. Once these three ingredients (empirical evidence, logic, and semantics) have been considered, I don't see what is left that is specifically "metaphysical."
Matthew, let me ask you: what, exactly, do you think is outside of semantics, science, or logic, in those arguments? That is, what is specifically "metaphysical"?
I question the idea of identity. It is my contention that consciousness is an aspect of our universe, given that, an identity is merely something that separates one from everything that is to some given degree, and thus more of an impediment than a means of progress.
If Aristotle died in 322 B.C., then within a hundred years of that would be the third century B.C., not the first, which would be the last hundred years of the B.C. ear.
Michael, consciousness is an aspect of our universe in the sense that we are conscious and part of the universe. Nothing else, as far as I can tell.
As for identity, you don't think that you and I are distinct organisms and thinking persons? Then how come we disagree on things, or find ourselves in different locations in the universe?
Thanks for the correction about Andronicus.
Forgot to thank you for your courtesy on Andronicus, just had not read the whole reply.
The hands of a watch and the winding stem are different parts of a watch, but they work in unison, part of a single entity. In my view, based on the Big Bang or pre-Big Bang theory, this Universe emerged as a unity, which quickly began to differentiate. Everything and everyone is made of this original source and it has retained itself as one universe. That we may disagree is allowed, what matters is where we find agreement on our road to wisdom.
The fact that we are made of the same stuff is indisputable. It does not follow that we are the same thing.
The stuff we are made of is energy, that has condensed into forms. The forms and their perceptions are different by nature, the energy remains basically the same.
I'm thanking you! Sometimes even two or three reads of my drafts don't catch everything before publication.
Again, no qualms about energy and matter. But the claim about identity simply does not follow. Being made of the same stuff (matter / energy) that behaves in the same way (according to the laws of nature) does not at all imply that you and I are identical.
There is a difference between being identical and being a part of a whole, each with its own perspective.
Massimo, I don't see metaphysics as efforts at epistemiological rigor as much as interpretations of the (scientific) facts. I realize some metaphysicians may claim otherwise, but that's why they can be so liable to the criticisms you list here. Seen only as interpretations of the facts, I don't perceive anything wrong with their endeavors. Their insights can resonate with people, offering them a grounding and meaning in reality that scientific facts alone fail to do. In fact, with the gradual demise of religions, they seem to be just what the doctor ordered in a world where a sense of the transcendent is being undermined by the crass materialism and consumerism that are the mark of our societies.
You make ask, does this make metaphysics only useful and practical, rather than true? Maybe! But then again, maybe not! As we have learned more about the world, from shamanic times until today, our interpretations have evolved, too. As science has come come closer to truth, maybe the interpretations of science are doing the same. Bottom line: I don't understand why you feel the need to be so critical of these people. If anything, they may be filling a void that science on its own fails to do.
Jim, well, I feel the need to be critical of anyone who makes claims they cannot deliver, because that's intellectually either vacuous or dishonest.
But in this case seems to me that we agree: what you present as metaphysics-as-interpretation-of science is what is called scientific metaphysics by people like James Ladyman and Don Ross. And that's exactly what I endorse.
I'm not familiar with them, but I strongly suspect they don't do the kind of interpreting I had in mind! 😀
Here's a premise I offer based on what I've read and studied over the years. I've seen psychologists make the same claim. Humans need a story. A narrative that provides direction, purpose, and meaning. Religions fulfilled this need for centuries. Now their influence is waning (in no small part due to science) and people are increasingly feeling a void that needs to be filled. What I'm suggesting is a new, science-based story that can fulfill this function, and this is what I see many cosmologists and various thinkers doing. It's sometimes called the Universe Story, or Epic of Evolution. This "story" (or stories, since interpretations can vary) draws on the cosmological, biological, and cultural evolution of the universe and encourages people to see their lives from this cosmic perspective. Now if scientists feel the need to strike this down because interpretations seem unwarranted, or because they see category mistakes or logical inconsistencies or anthrpomorphism, it totally misses the point. This endeavor isn't meant to deliver metaphysical proofs or to pass every scientific requirement. It's meant to provide coherence, meaning, and a heartfelt sense of belonging in an otherwise seemingly meaningless and hostile universe. And who's to say? It could be true to boot! 😀
Jim, you seem to be describing what a science popularizer like Carl Sagan or Richard Dawkins might do. No qualms there. My target are professional metaphysicians who pretend to discover new things about the world that are somehow distinct from what science, logic, and language do.
No. I'm aware that Sagan and Dawkins try to invoke the majesty and wonder of science, but in the end they leave me a bit cold. I mean people like Brian Swimme or integral theory philosophers - or even cosmologists or some theologians for that matter. In fact I try to integrate Stoicism with some of these insights - viewing the prookopton as a call in cosmic evolution. As usual though, the theory is a lot easier than the practice! 😆
Jim, yeah those are clearly not my cups of tea. A bit too woo for my taste. And I don't actually think people need that sort of crutch to deal with existential problems.
That said, the current post has a different target, it's about so-called analytic metaphysics, which is the dominant approach to metaphysics in professional philosophy.
Sure, maybe crutch for some, but a necessary and meaningful life narrative for others. Recall my premise, the human need for a story. A story that could lie on a spectrum from the poetic and metaphorical to the purposeful and real, whatever the inclination of the particular person.
Yes, I realize my musings are a bit off topic from the post at hand, but given your misgivings about (analytic) metaphysics in general, I thought it useful to suggest another angle to the subject.
Agreed with all that Massimo, except that I prefer Dennet's take on free will to Sapolski's and Unger & Smolin's on time. Both seem equally empirically and scientifically based but somehow have a greater intuitive appeal; not that that is necessarily a guide to anything.
Thanks
One of the oldest argument is that we keep returning to the same issue if in practise as a culture or articles on substack. It never seams to go away. Do we still believe that everything we do not understand is magic as we do in demons. Or are there just somethings that Science can most likely never answer. Is not the most logical and rational answer is one falls in the area of metaphysics?
I would suggest your argument overreaches the support given. That there are no metaphysical questions and that everything reduces to science, logic, or semantics. But detailed examples used are the identity puzzles of Theseus’ Ship and the Star Trek transporter. These are already the easiest cases to treat as matters of definition and they are not representative all.
Much of metaphysics concerns grounding, modality, laws of nature, ontological dependence, universals, particulars, and the structure of necessity. These are not reducible to empirical science because physics presupposes them. Physics might say what the laws are but the question of what it means for something to count as a law is not a scientific finding and not a semantic choice.
The question of free will is not sorted by neuroscience as it is not just about physical mechanism but about the relation between agency, causation, and responsibility. The mind body issue is not resolved by pointing out that the universe contains matter and energy since this leaves the problem of mental properties unexamined.
By saying “there are no metaphysical questions” functions as a metaphysical thesis about the structure and limits of inquiry. It is not placable in science or semantics without circularity.
Some philosophical puzzles arise from language I can agree with and in certain cases clarification dissolves confusion. But identity puzzles do not define the everything and the saying that all metaphysics collapses into other fields requires argument rather than assertion.
Edgar, to begin with, I have a large number of examples, not limited to issues of identity. Second, as usual, my point is epistemological: there certainly are limits to science and reason, but what *else* has provided us with anything tangible? The questions you list have been discussed by metaphysicians for millennia, and no progress has been made. According to philosopher of science Imre Lakatos this would qualify metaphysics as a "degenrate" research program, similar to pseudoscience.
Let's take just one of those examples: the laws of nature. We have learned far more about them from physics than from anything that any metaphysicians has ever written. And if there are questions about them that we can't answer, so be it. Inventing answers that rest on nothing isn't helpful.
Even if we agree with Lakatos only shows that some questions progress slowly not that they are illegitimate. Unresolved empirical problems are endless... dark matter, consciousness, the measurement problem, the origin of life, or Alzheimers mechanisms.
We do not dismiss these as “degenerate” or unhelpful.
Unresolved does not mean invented and analysing concepts is not the same as fabricating answers.
Nor is it fabrication to accept the most logical and coherent provisional answer when necessary, so long as it is not contrary to what we do know. Temporary models are a normal part of inquiry until better evidence arrives. As does not science do the exact same thing?
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No, science most definitely does not do the same thing. Again, we either make progress or we accept that we don't currently have viable answers. Metaphysics does neither, it pretends to have answers. Metaphysicians do not "accept the most logical and coherent provosional answer," they keep bickering for millennia about their favorite pet theory. Not the same thing.
Can I ask how you incorporate modality into your anti-metaphysical ideas. Maybe also how you understand truths that are both necessary and a posteriori? I get this may be a bigger conversation so maybe best saved for another day. If so thanks for the discussion.
Not difficult at all: modality is the joint providence of language and logic, and when it pertains real world situations it has to be empirically informed.
"Truth" pertains to epistemology, and on that I'm with Quine: epistemology is an empirical discipline. The only "necessary" truths are found in math and logic, which means they are the result of tautologies. There is no such thing as a necessary truth in the physical world.
Not sure that Kripke would agree