I think what Sagan was as getting at, like Hume, is the necessity for proportionality. Extraordinary evidence isn’t necessary for all claims - that ice exists, that black balls exist, that a particular drug works - just the extraordinary ones like “there’s an invisible dragon in my garage”.
If one were to switch the phrase to, as Mr. West seems to suggest: “Extraordinary claims require sufficient evidence” (aside from sterilizing the rhetorical flourish of Sagan’s wit) it really wouldn’t change anything about the meaning of the initial statement except an arbitrary preference for the word “sufficient”.
The meaning of the maxim is already clearly stating that for extraordinary claims only extraordinary evidence would be sufficient.
Jim, I see. I don't agree with West's specific suggestion, but I recommended the article because it does make one think about the epistemic warrant of different kind of claims. West is right that Sagan's dictum has become a mindless mantra for some skeptics, who don't actually pay attention to the underlying epistemic issues. And mindless skepticism is no skepticism at all.
I read that Mick West article and was really disappointed in it. Maybe the Skeptical Inquirer should change its name to the Semantic Inquirer.
Jim, I'm curious, what did you find disappointing about it? And why the Skeptical-to-Semantic suggestion?
I think what Sagan was as getting at, like Hume, is the necessity for proportionality. Extraordinary evidence isn’t necessary for all claims - that ice exists, that black balls exist, that a particular drug works - just the extraordinary ones like “there’s an invisible dragon in my garage”.
If one were to switch the phrase to, as Mr. West seems to suggest: “Extraordinary claims require sufficient evidence” (aside from sterilizing the rhetorical flourish of Sagan’s wit) it really wouldn’t change anything about the meaning of the initial statement except an arbitrary preference for the word “sufficient”.
The meaning of the maxim is already clearly stating that for extraordinary claims only extraordinary evidence would be sufficient.
Jim, I see. I don't agree with West's specific suggestion, but I recommended the article because it does make one think about the epistemic warrant of different kind of claims. West is right that Sagan's dictum has become a mindless mantra for some skeptics, who don't actually pay attention to the underlying epistemic issues. And mindless skepticism is no skepticism at all.
I agree with that sentiment.