Really interesting re. the insulation of ordinary from philosophical beliefs. I think Burnyeat is correct, skepticism - and philosphical thinking in general - is impractical for the most part. Yet... it still changes our practical nature at an almost unconscious level. Since learning about Academic Scepticism, I'm less dismissive of opposing views and less likely to jump to conclusions, I also seem to give people the benefit of the doubt a lot more than I used to. Skepticism is, without doubt, the "dry" Hellenistic philosphy, yet it's the most useful, and perhaps urgent, to navigate our supposedly "post-truth" socio-political landscape.
Steven, I agree. I think Pyrrhonism's notion of suspension of judgment is useful, though it cannot (and probably should not) be used as extensively as the Pyrrhonists suggested.
I find Academic Skepticism more practical, because of the notion of probability. It doesn't stand on its own as a life philosophy, but it can nicely complement an approach like the Stoic one.
Yes the Pyrrhonists. I wondering if they completely opposed Aristotle’s concept of flourishing, as I understand it to be a process of taking on appropriate qualities. But as I think you stated they,the Pyrrhonists, never defined those type of things. Thank you.
They definitely disagreed with Aristotle. They thought that any speculation about what constitutes flourishing, or how to arrive at it, falls squarely within the very broad category of "non-evident matters."
Hello Massimo, can you help me understand some of this?
As far as I can see, skepticism gained traction post Aristotle, and was a challenge to the experimental way his school thought of experiments as finite way for gain knowledge. But non the less skepticism did support for way to gain knowledge, and it was through experience, as stated in Aenesidemus’ mode 9.
Maks, the Pyrrhonists were not against the notion of knowledge. But it seems like in practice they pretty much always cashed it out in the negative, as in "there is no good reason to believe X." In general, they were skeptical of anything concerning "non-observables." Though they never exactly defined what they meant by it, much of what we consider science is concerned with non-observables.
This is very different from the other skeptics, the Academic ones, who thought that although Knowledge and Truth (with capital letters) are unlikely or impossible, we can arrive at different degrees of probability in order to provisionally accept or reject some notions, including scientific ones.
You keep educating me, professor Pigliucci. I probably shouldn't admit it, but I'd never even heard of Sextus before this. Keep teaching this old dog new stuff--thanks!
Really interesting re. the insulation of ordinary from philosophical beliefs. I think Burnyeat is correct, skepticism - and philosphical thinking in general - is impractical for the most part. Yet... it still changes our practical nature at an almost unconscious level. Since learning about Academic Scepticism, I'm less dismissive of opposing views and less likely to jump to conclusions, I also seem to give people the benefit of the doubt a lot more than I used to. Skepticism is, without doubt, the "dry" Hellenistic philosphy, yet it's the most useful, and perhaps urgent, to navigate our supposedly "post-truth" socio-political landscape.
Steven, I agree. I think Pyrrhonism's notion of suspension of judgment is useful, though it cannot (and probably should not) be used as extensively as the Pyrrhonists suggested.
I find Academic Skepticism more practical, because of the notion of probability. It doesn't stand on its own as a life philosophy, but it can nicely complement an approach like the Stoic one.
Yes the Pyrrhonists. I wondering if they completely opposed Aristotle’s concept of flourishing, as I understand it to be a process of taking on appropriate qualities. But as I think you stated they,the Pyrrhonists, never defined those type of things. Thank you.
They definitely disagreed with Aristotle. They thought that any speculation about what constitutes flourishing, or how to arrive at it, falls squarely within the very broad category of "non-evident matters."
Hello Massimo, can you help me understand some of this?
As far as I can see, skepticism gained traction post Aristotle, and was a challenge to the experimental way his school thought of experiments as finite way for gain knowledge. But non the less skepticism did support for way to gain knowledge, and it was through experience, as stated in Aenesidemus’ mode 9.
So is that a sensible observation?
Maks, the Pyrrhonists were not against the notion of knowledge. But it seems like in practice they pretty much always cashed it out in the negative, as in "there is no good reason to believe X." In general, they were skeptical of anything concerning "non-observables." Though they never exactly defined what they meant by it, much of what we consider science is concerned with non-observables.
This is very different from the other skeptics, the Academic ones, who thought that although Knowledge and Truth (with capital letters) are unlikely or impossible, we can arrive at different degrees of probability in order to provisionally accept or reject some notions, including scientific ones.
Read the book twice last month and got some interesting insights. But inspiration would not be my description.
You keep educating me, professor Pigliucci. I probably shouldn't admit it, but I'd never even heard of Sextus before this. Keep teaching this old dog new stuff--thanks!
Glad to be of help, my friend.